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Concerns over corporate behaviour in areas as seemingly disparate as homicide, 
manslaughter, bribery and tax evasion have led to experimentation with new models of 
corporate criminality, as distinct from individual criminality, to avoid obstacles to 
prosecution posed by the common law’s identification principle that effectively limits 
prosecution to small companies where an individual can be said to the company’s “directing 
mind and will”. Foremost amongst these has been the “failure to prevent” model introduced 
by the Bribery Act 2010. This has been perceived to have been successful in changing 
corporate behaviour, with widespread adoption of new corporate practices evidencing that 
compliance is taken seriously. As a consequence, it has been proposed that this model be 
extended to other areas of behaviour regarded as economic crimes. HMRC warmly endorsed 
the model and the Criminal Finances Act 2017, which received Royal Assent on 27 April 
2017, contains new corporate tax offences, relating to the failure to prevent UK and foreign 
tax evasion that are expected to come into force by the end of September 2017. In early 2017, 
the Ministry of Justice issued a “Call for Evidence on Corporate Liability for Economic 
Crime”, with particular reference to its proposal to create “failure to prevent” fraud, false 
accounting and money-laundering offences. This article focuses specifically on the potential 
of the new model to combat corporate fraud and evaluates: the problem of “economic 
crime”; the historical development of the “failure to prevent” model of organisational 
liability for bribery; its effectiveness in the context of the Bribery Act 2010; the relative 
ineffectiveness of the law in combatting fraud in a financial services context; and the 
appropriateness of the “failure to prevent” model to “economic crime”, specifically fraud. In 
conclusion, it argues for the retention of the common law as a flexible and effective tool in 
appropriate cases. We argue that the “failure to prevent” model will be a useful extension of 
the law when combined with a due diligence defence as it may improve corporate behaviour 
in a range of typically larger companies where the common law is unlikely to assist. 
However, we argue that it is nonetheless severely limited in its application to criminal frauds 
because it is predicated on the commission of an offence by an individual. In such cases 
where the individuals involved in the conduct are not as individuals dishonest, it is argued 
that an additional mechanism is required to enforce the core criminal offences committed 
and reflect and stigmatise corporate culpability appropriately. The authors recommend this 
be done by way of a simple Criminal Practice Direction in relation to offending of this nature 
restating orthodox and well-established evidential presumptions in the criminal law.    
 
THE PROBLEM OF “ECONOMIC CRIME” 
 
                                                             
1 Dr S.F. Copp, Associate Professor, and Dr A. Cronin, Senior Lecturer in Law, Department of Law, Bournemouth 
University. This article builds on the authors’ response to the Ministry of Justice “Call for Evidence on 
Corporate Liability for Economic Crime” submitted to the Ministry of Justice on 23 March 2017. The law is 
generally stated as at 9 May 2017.  
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Growth in international and national scale 
 
Criminal activity involving companies, whether in terms of money-laundering, fraud, bribery 
or tax evasion seems increasingly unresponsive to traditional legal strategies and has grown 
to a scale incurring significant economic consequences. In the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, evidence of misconduct is emerging that has never before “occurred so 
systematically, in such a scale and across multiple jurisdictions.” 2  
 
The estimates globally for money-laundering are truly eye-watering. According to a study of 
studies conducted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime the amounts available for money-
laundering in 2009 were equivalent to 3.6% of GDP or US$ 2.1 trillion
3
 with money flows 
relating to transnational organised crime activities equivalent to 1.5% of global GDP or US$ 
870 billion.
4
 Furthermore, 70% of these money flows would have been available for 
laundering through the financial system, equivalent to 1% of global GDP or US$ 590 billion.
5
 
The UK’s National Crime Agency believes that “many hundreds of billions of international 
criminal money is laundered through UK banks, including their subsidiaries, each year”.6 HM 
Treasury and the Home Office see money-laundering as a key enabler of serious and 
organised crime, involving more broadly based measures of social and economic costs, 
estimated at £24 billion each year as well as a threat to national security.
7
 Reflecting perhaps 
the increasing priority attached to this issue, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
announced its largest penalty ever for a failure to maintain an adequate anti-money-
laundering control framework against Deutsche Bank AG, being a fine of just over £163 
million in January 2017.
8
 
 
                                                             
2 M. Shafik, Bank of England Deputy Governor, Markets and Banking, “From ‘ethical drift’ to ‘ethical lift’: 
Reversing the tide of misconduct in global financial markets” speech given at the panel discussion Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Conference on ‘Reforming Culture and Behaviour in the Financial Services Industry’ 
Oct. 20, 2016, at 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx/Documents/speeches/2016/speech930.
pdf  [Accessed May 29, 2017].  See also the comments made by the European Parliament, Directorate General 
for Internal Policies, Policy Dept A: Economic and Scientific Policy, Consumer Protection Aspects of Financial 
Services (2014), IP/A/IMCO/ST/2013-07 Feb. 2014 at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/507463/IPOL-
IMCO_ET(2014)507463_EN.pdf [Accessed May 29, 2017]. 
3 “Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organised crime: 
Research Report” (UNODC, October 2011), at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf [Accessed May 21, 2017]. 
4 “Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organised crime: 
Research Report” (UNODC, October 2011), at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf [Accessed May 21, 2017] pp.5-7. 
5 “Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organised crime: 
Research Report” (UNODC, October 2011), at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf [Accessed May 21, 2017] pp.5-7. 
6 http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/crime-threats/money-laundering [Accessed May 5, 2017]. 
7 HM Treasury & Home Office, “UK national risk assessment of money-laundering and terrorist financing” (Oct. 
2015), p.3. This figure is dominated by the cost of drug-supply of £10.7 billion and fraud with a cost of £8.9 
billion, see p.19. The report acknowledges that less is known of the costs of cyber-crime and modern slavery. 
8 Financial Conduct Authority Final Notice to Deutsche Bank AG dated 30th Jan. 2017, at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/deutsche-bank-2017.pdf [Accessed May 21, 2017]. 
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The estimates for the amount of bribery and its costs, which may be very different, have 
become the subject of some controversy.
9
 Estimates indicate that the scale of the problem 
internationally has grown from $1.1 trillion in 2005 to between $1.5 trillion to $2 trillion in 
2015.
10
 The proportion of companies that have to pay bribes to win or retain business varies 
enormously globally, 15% in industrialised countries, 30% in Asia and 60% in former Soviet 
Union countries.
11
 The position in the UK is unclear; however, some idea of the potential 
scale of the problem may be shown by the record payment of £497.25 million plus interest 
and costs by Rolls-Royce plc under the terms of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement made 
with the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in 2017, following a four-year investigation into bribery 
and corruption, with the total paid out by Rolls-Royce being approximately £671 million 
when payments to the US and Brazil were taken into account.
12
 The costs of bribery are often 
indirect or concealed; as the Ministry of Justice has pointed out they may include: contracts 
not being specified or enforced properly, e.g. services not performed to the required standard 
or over-specified with unnecessary gold-plating; transaction costs may be higher; competition 
impaired; incentives to invest and innovate undermined; as well as serious reputational 
damage and strategic disruption if concerns arise.
13
 However, in the case of bribery, it has 
been argued that the new approach to imposing criminal liability in the Bribery Act 2010 has 
had a significant impact in addressing and perhaps reducing bribery in the UK. 
Equally eye-watering are the global estimates for fraud. PKF have estimated that in 2013 the 
global loss from fraud might have cost an equivalent of £2.78 trillion, more than 50% greater 
than the UK’s entire GDP for the period.14 Examples of the sorts of areas where losses were 
found to have been measured were wide-ranging, whether in terms of sector, e.g. agriculture, 
construction, education and housing and in terms of activity e.g. compensation, payroll and 
procurement.
15
 Using the terminology employed in the National Fraud Indicator, fraud alone 
is estimated to have cost
16
 the UK economy a staggering £193 billion in 2016,
17
 rising from 
£52 billion in 2013.
18
 While the exponential leap in the amount estimated over that period 
may be explained more by other factors than by a particularly sharp increase in fraudulent 
                                                             
9 See, for example, M. Stephenson “The Amount of Bribery and the Cost of Bribery are not the same”, The 
Global Anticorruption Blog (15.12.15). 
10 International Monetary Fund, Staff Discussion Note “Corruption: Costs and Mitigating Strategies” (May 
2016), p.5, citing D. Kaufman “Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption” (Munich: MPRA Paper 8089) 
(2005) and an extrapolation by him in 2015 based on the earlier estimate. 
11 Transparency International UK, Corruption Data at http://www.transparency.org.uk/corruption-data, cited 
by Ministry of Justice “Impact Assessment of bill on reform of the law on bribery” (Implementation stage, 
version 2), p.7. 
12 “SFO completes £497.25 million Deferred Prosecution Agreement with Rolls-Royce PLC”, SFO News Release 
17 Jan. 2017. 
13 Ministry of Justice, “Impact Assessment of bill on reform of the law on bribery”, (Implementation stage, 
version 2), p.7. 
14 J. Gee and M. Button, “The Financial Cost of Fraud 2015” (PKF and University of Portsmouth, 2015), p.10.  
15 J. Gee and M. Button, “The Financial Cost of Fraud 2015” (PKF and University of Portsmouth, 2015), p.7.  
16 This may be better expressed as a misallocation of resources. 
17 PKF, Experian and Portsmouth University Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, “Annual Fraud Indicator 2016” at 
http://www.port.ac.uk/media/contacts-and-departments/icjs/ccfs/Annual-Fraud-Indicator-2016.pdf [Accessed 
May 21, 2016].  
18 National Fraud Authority, 6 June 2013 at http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/annual-fraud-
indicator--2 [Accessed May 21, 2017].   
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activity itself,
19
 it is quite clear that fraud remains a widespread problem despite considerable 
legislative attention in the Fraud Act 2006. Beyond the quantifiable financial cost, there is 
also the documented social cost of economic crime: small businesses forced into bankruptcy, 
livelihoods ruined, jobs destroyed and opportunities lost, the inestimable impact on society 
and people’s health and well-being.20  
 
It may even be that the global estimates for fraudulent behaviour cited above grossly 
underestimate the full extent of fraudulent behaviour, acknowledging as they do frauds 
perpetrated against organisations but not necessarily those arguably committed by them. This 
is not a matter of criticism but simply reflects the different methodologies that may be 
employed in the selection and calculation of activities considered criminally fraudulent. The 
authors have addressed this issue elsewhere in terms of how addressing off-balance sheet 
finance as a matter of accounting regulation means that its potential categorisation as criminal 
fraud may be overlooked
21
. The impact of addressing other forms of misconduct as matters of 
financial services regulation may have similar effect. Accordingly,  the 2016 Annual Fraud 
Indicator provides a comprehensive account of a number of types of fraud but does not refer 
to the various mis-selling cases that have pervaded the financial services industry.
22
 If put to 
the test in the criminal courts, many of the numerous mis-selling scandals that have hit the 
headlines over recent years, might perhaps be found to constitute fraud.
23
 On this basis, £54 
billion might be added to the figures, representing the total in compensation paid out by the 
major retail banks and building societies in the UK in the 15 years since 2000 for mis-selling 
activities.
24
 In addition, further claims, currently estimated to amount to £33 billion, may 
result from the Supreme Court decision in Plevin v Paragon [2014] relating to the non-
                                                             
19 For example, different methodologies for the reports and, in particular, the fact that there is no accepted 
definition of “fraud” which leaves the scope of the activities included in the reports open to variation. 
20 New City Agenda and Cass Business School, “Cultural Change in the FCA, PRA and Bank of England, Practising 
What They Preach?”, 25 October 2016 at http://newcityagenda.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NCA-
Cultural-change-in-regulators-report_embargoed.pdf [Accessed May 21, 2017] p.13. 
21 S. Copp and A. Cronin, “The failure of criminal law to control the use of off balance sheet finance during the 
banking crisis” (2015) 36 Company Lawyer (4) 99. 
22 PKF, Experian and Portsmouth University Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, “Annual Fraud Indicator 2016” at 
http://www.port.ac.uk/media/contacts-and-departments/icjs/ccfs/Annual-Fraud-Indicator-2016.pdf [Accessed 
May 21, 2016] which specifically includes tax fraud, NHS fraud, benefits fraud, vehicle excise fraud, TV licence 
fee fraud, blue badge fraud, retail and telecommunications fraud, council tax fraud, rail transport fraud, ID 
fraud against consumers, payroll fraud, procurement fraud, grants fraud, mortgage fraud, credit/debit card 
fraud, cheque fraud, housing tenancy fraud, motor finance fraud, insurance fraud. 
23 The generic offence is contained in the Fraud Act 2006 and can be made out either through the making of a 
false or misleading representation, Fraud Act 2006, s.1(1)(2)(a) and s.2; or failing to disclose information that a 
person is legally obliged to disclose, Fraud Act 2006, s.1(1)(2)(b) and s.3; or by abusing a position occupied in 
relation to the financial interests of another, Fraud Act 2006, s.1(1)(2)(c) and s.4. If done dishonestly, Fraud Act 
2006, s.2(1)(a), s.3(a), s.4(1)(b), and with an intention to make a gain for himself or another, or to cause a loss 
to another or to expose another to a risk of loss, Fraud Act 2006, s.2(1)(b)(i) and (ii), s.3(b)(i) and (ii), s.4(1)(c)(i) 
and (ii). A conviction can follow with a term of up to 10 years’ imprisonment. 
24
 New City Agenda and Cass Business School, “Cultural Change in the FCA, PRA and Bank of England, Practising 
What They Preach?”, 25 October 2016 at http://newcityagenda.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NCA-
Cultural-change-in-regulators-report_embargoed.pdf [Accessed May 21, 2017]. 
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disclosure of sales commissions paid on these policies.
25
 Numerous other mis-selling 
complaints include interest rate hedging schemes, packaged accounts, interest only 
mortgages, investments and other insurance products.
26
 More recently, it has been suggested 
that liability for mis-selling pension annuities may prove to be as extensive as the personal 
protection insurance scandal.
27
 
 
Legal problems of attribution hinder criminal prosecution 
 
The common law’s approach to attributing criminal liability to companies, employing the so-
called “identification principle”, has posed serious difficulties. The common law foundation 
of criminal liability is traditionally expressed in the Latin maxim “actus non facit reum nisi 
mens sit rea”28 which essentially means that “whatever the deed a man may have done, it 
cannot make him criminally punishable unless his doing of it was actuated by a legally 
blameworthy attitude of mind”.29 Further, in accordance with the criminal law’s individualist 
ideal, the state of mind in question is determined subjectively rather than by reference to an 
objective standard of behaviour.
30
 A review of the means by which criminal culpability can 
be attracted in the context of corporate activity reveals various possibilities. In the first 
instance, an individual employee may commit the substantive offence in question and attract 
individual liability, for example under s. 1 Fraud Act
31
 for fraudulent activity of a proscribed 
type
32
 or s. 1, 2 or 6 of the Bribery Act 2010 for an offence of bribery, being bribed or bribing 
a foreign public official. The liability is contained at the individual level, whether or not the 
misconduct was intended to benefit the company, unless the individual actor involved is so 
senior in the organisation that he is deemed to be its controlling mind.
33
 In such a case, the 
company itself may also be criminally liable for the substantive offence under the 
“identification doctrine”. Application of this doctrine means that a corporation can be found 
guilty of a substantive offence, for example fraud contrary to s. 1 Fraud Act or one of the 
bribery offences set out at ss. 1, 2 and 6 Bribery Act, the mens rea, namely the dishonesty 
and/or relevant intent, of the senior individual being attributable to the corporate entity itself. 
Further, if liability is attributed to the company under this doctrine, other company officers 
may attract culpability for the offence if they have consented to or connived in its 
                                                             
25 Plevin v Paragon Personal Finance Ltd [2014] UKSC 61. The Supreme Court held that the Consumer Credit 
Act 1974, ss.140A to 140D applied and the non-disclosure of the amount of commissions and the identity of 
the recipients did make the debtor-creditor relationship unfair under s.140A(1)(c) and the creditor may not 
have taken out the personal protection insurance had she known the amount of the commission charged.  
26
 www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/news/speech/2013/CW-BILA-conference.pdf [Accessed May 21, 2017]. 
27 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/pensions/11286965/Annuity-mis-selling-scandal-
could-it-be-as-big-as-PPI.html [Accessed May 21, 2017]. 
28 See, for example, Lord Kenyon CJ in Fowler v Padget (1798) 7 T.R. 509; Lord Goddard CJ in Harding v Price 
[1948] 1 K.B. 695. 
29 J.W. Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime (Stevens & Sons, 1964) Vol. 1. 
30 A recent example of the subjectivist tendency can be found in the criminal damage case of R. v G. [2004] 1 
A.C. 1034 (HL) in which the objective test of recklessness was replaced in favour of a subjective test. 
31 Fraud Act 2006, s.1 and referring to ss.2, 3 and 4. 
32 In addition, if a business is carried out for a fraudulent purpose, statutory provisions impose liability under 
Companies Act 2006, s.993 and Fraud Act 2006, s.9 where an individual participates in a fraudulent business 
carried on by a sole trader.  
33 Tesco v Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153 (HL). 
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commission.
34
 As far as corporate liability is concerned, criminal culpability is restricted to 
cases in which the individual who is deemed to be the “directing mind and will” of the 
corporation, acting and speaking for it, is himself guilty of the offence.
35
  
 
The construction of corporate liability on this basis is now dated in that it is premised in a 
notion of corporations comprising relatively simple, pyramidal managerial frameworks. This 
means that large companies with typically complex organisational structures and 
decentralised responsibility are likely to evade prosecution whereas smaller companies, with 
directors more likely to be involved in the day to day activities of the business, are convicted 
much more readily.
36
 As a basis of fault, it can be said that the “identification principle” 
underestimates the complexity and subtlety of corporate action, imposing an already 
simplified biological model on an equally simplified appreciation of corporate management 
and behaviour.
37
 In practice, corporate policy and decision-making is often decentralised or 
the product of other corporate policies and procedures rather than the result of individual 
decisions.
38
 Indeed, the “identification principle” of liability attribution serves as a real 
incentive to senior managers to “turn a blind eye” to questionable or dubious practices and it 
acts as a disincentive for the internal reporting of suspected illegality.
39
 Therefore, as a 
method of attributing criminal liability, “it fails to reflect the reality of the modern day large 
multinational corporation (...) [and] it produces what many regard as an unsatisfactory narrow 
scope for criminal liability”.40 Furthermore, the need to identify the criminality of an 
individual of sufficient seniority, as a precursor to corporate prosecution, incurs evidential 
problems which inevitably increase as the size of the company increases.
41
 In the absence of 
the involvement of an actor whose mind is deemed to be that of the organisation itself, 
corporations have not been liable for the crimes perpetrated by their employees or agents in 
the course of business, even where the offending activity is to the benefit of the 
organisation.
42
 As a result of these limitations, bespoke statutory reforms have been enacted 
                                                             
34
 For example, directors, managers, secretaries or similar or persons purporting to act in any such capacity will 
be equally culpable if the offence is proved to have been committed with their consent or connivance, see 
Fraud Act 2006, s.12(2)(a) and (b) and Bribery Act 2010, s.14. 
35 This terminology is attributed to Viscount Haldane, Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] 
A.C. 705 (HL).  
36 See, for example, the prosecution of the small company in R. v Kite & OLL Ltd., 8 Dec 1994. T. Woolf, “The 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) - Towards a Realist Vision of Corporate Criminal Liability” (1997) Criminal Law 
Journal 257. See too, HMRC “Tackling offshore tax evasion: a new corporate criminal offence of failure to 
prevent the facilitation of evasion” (Consultation document, 16 July 2015). 
37
 C. Harding, Criminal Enterprise, Individuals, Organisations and Criminal Responsibility (Willan, 2007) Ch 9. 
38 C.M.V. Clarkson, ‘Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls’ [1996] Modern Law Review 557, 561. 
39 HMRC “Tackling offshore tax evasion: a new corporate criminal offence of failure to prevent the facilitation 
of evasion”, (Consultation document, 16 July 2015). 
40 D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) p. 249, a view shared by 
Gobert, see J. Gobert, “Corporate Criminality: four models of fault” (1994) 14(3) Legal Studies 393, 395. 
41 M. Hsaio, “Abandonment of the Doctrine of Attribution in favour of Gross Negligence Test in the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007” (2009) 30(4) Company Lawyer 110, 111. 
42 The need to find a “directing mind and will” with which to equate corporate blameworthiness is a relatively 
recent proposition emanating from the civil case of H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd. 
[1957] 1 Q.B. 159 (CA) and followed in Tesco Ltd v Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153 (HL). Prior to this authority existed 
for the application of established agency principles to corporate liability, see A. Cronin, “Reforming Corporate 
Fraud Regulation in the UK: A Model of Manifest Liability”, PhD thesis, Bournemouth University (Taylor Francis, 
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in relation to corporate manslaughter,
43
 bribery
44
 and tax evasion
45
 and reform is now 
proposed more broadly in other areas of economic crime. 
 
The first significant innovation, the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
2007, introduced a distinct statutory basis for corporate liability where death arises as a 
consequence of a gross breach of the duty of care owed to the deceased by the organisation.
46
 
Subsequently, the Bribery Act 2010 imposed corporate criminal culpability on the basis of a 
failure of the organisation to prevent its employees or associated persons bribing another to 
the advantage of the organisation where there have been inadequate procedures in place to 
prevent the conduct.
47
 The Bribery Act therefore works in tandem to the common law 
“identification doctrine”, the new statutory “failure to prevent” model adding to the type of   
corporate culpability that may be incurred by imposing corporate liability for ineffective 
control of “rogue” employees.  
 
Government proposals for a new approach to “economic crime” 
 
In December 2014, the government published its UK Anti-Corruption Plan.
48
 Whilst this 
focused specifically on bribery, corruption,
49
 money laundering, and a number of highly 
particularised settings in which these crimes are perpetrated,
50
 Action 36 set out a 
commitment to examine not only the case for a new offence of a corporate failure to prevent 
economic crime but also the rules on establishing corporate criminal liability more widely.
51
 
However, within just a year, on 28th September 2015, the Justice Minister, Andrew Selous, 
revealed that the Ministry of Justice had abandoned its work on corporate criminal liability 
for failure to prevent economic crimes
52
. The reasons given for this decision were two-fold: 
first, there had been no corporate prosecutions to date for the Bribery Act offence of failing to 
prevent bribery and, second, there was little evidence of corporate economic wrongdoing 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
2017, forthcoming) sub nom “Corporate Criminality and Liability for Fraud” and the analysis of Triplex Safety 
Glass Co Ltd. v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd. [1939] 2 K.B. 395 (CA); R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] K.B. 551 
(CCA); Moore v Bresler Ltd. [1944] 2 All E.R. 515.   
43 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. 
44 Bribery Act 2010, s. 7. 
45 Criminal Finances Act 2017, Pt. 3, ss. 45 and 46. 
46 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s.1. 
47
 Bribery Act 2010, s.7. 
48 HM Government “UK Anti-Corruption Plan”, (Dec. 2014). 
49 Although acknowledging there is no universally accepted definition of “corruption”, the UK Anti-Corruption 
Plan seems to accept that corruption is the abuse of power for personal gain, HM Government “UK Anti-
Corruption Plan”, (Dec. 2014) p.9. 
50 For example, organised crime, corruption in government departments and agencies, corruption, jury 
nobbling, corruption at borders, corruption by MPs, local authorities, the MOD, sports and betting, financial 
services and in the context of financial markets. The Plan also looks at money laundering and terrorism and the 
proceeds of crime, and generally at whistle-blowing provisions, HM Government “UK Anti-Corruption Plan” 
(Dec. 2014). 
51
 HM Government, “UK Anti-Corruption Plan” (Dec. 2014), p.14. 
52 https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/government-drops-plan-to-extend-corporate-criminal-
liability/5051277.article [Accessed June 6, 2017]. 
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going unpunished
53
. Despite this seeming lack of confidence in the new model, on 16 July 
2015, HMRC proposed the introduction of a new corporate offence of failing to prevent the 
facilitation of offshore tax evasion by its agents.
54
 Starting in 2016 for the Crown 
Dependencies and Overseas Territories and in 2017 for the remaining signatory countries, 
HMRC will receive detailed information about offshore accounts held by UK tax residents 
under the Common Reporting Standards.
55
 The Finance Act 2016 introduced tougher 
sanctions with civil financial penalties and additional criminal offences for individual 
employees and/or associated persons who enable offshore tax evasion,
56
 which will be built 
upon by the corporate “failure to prevent” offences in relation to both UK tax and foreign tax 
evasion in the Criminal Finances Act 2017.
57
 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s (OECD) Global Forum for Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes, currently with 140 members, provides the practical framework within 
which the offence will be constructed.
58
  In the meantime, the  failure to prevent economic 
crimes project has been resurrected by the Ministry of Justice, which on 12 May 2016 
announced that it would be consulting later in the year with a view to extending the “failure 
to prevent” model to fraud, false accounting and money-laundering.59  That call for evidence 
took place in early 2017, closing on the 24 March 2017.
60
 
 
The use of the terminology of “economic crime” to encompass issues of money-laundering, 
false accounting and fraud, whilst bribery and tax evasion are addressed under distinct 
measures, is to be regretted. There is a lack of logic using general terminology to cover 
money-laundering, false accounting and fraud whilst keeping other “economic” crimes, such 
as bribery and tax evasion, separate. It is submitted that the better solution would be to retain 
the status quo and reform the underlying legislation, for example, the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002, Terrorism Act 2000, Money-Laundering Regulations 2007 and Fraud Act 2006. 
Furthermore, the use of the term “economic” poses the risk that the very real human costs 
associated with these crimes may fail to be appreciated, they may be perceived as purely 
“economic” and victimless in nature. To take money-laundering as an example, the human 
costs associated with the practice may well include modern slavery, human trafficking and 
terrorist atrocities. The consequences of fraud may be less visible but, as has been identified 
above, may nonetheless include inestimable damage to people’s health and well-being 
through bankruptcy and other factors. The use of the term “economic crime” may also pose 
the risk of policy creep over time; it conjures up unfortunate connotations in its application in 
the former Soviet Union.
61
  
                                                             
53 Ibid, the Bribery Act 2010, which set out the innovative offence in s. 7, had come force on July 1, 2011 and 
therefore more than 4 years had then elapsed. 
54 HMRC “Tackling offshore tax evasion: a new corporate criminal offence of failure to prevent the facilitation 
of evasion” (Consultation document, 16 July 2015). 
55 This includes the name and address of the account holder, account numbers, interest and balances. 
56 Finance Act 2016, s.162 and Sch.20, s.166 inserting ss.106B to 106H into the Taxes Management Act 1970. 
57 Criminal Finances Act 2017, Pt 3, ss.45 and 46. 
58 http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/ [Accessed May 9, 2017]. 
59
 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-plans-to-tackle-corporate-fraud [Accessed June 26, 2016]. 
60 Ministry of Justice, “Call for Evidence on Corporate Liability for Economic Crime” 13 Jan. to 24 Mar. 2017. 
61 See, for example, “Economic Crimes under Soviet Law” (1951) University of Melbourne Res Judicata, 45. 
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Evaluation of the potential of a “failure to prevent” model to fraud in a financial 
services context 
This article will seek to evaluate whether the extension of the “failure to prevent” model, now 
employed in the Bribery Act 2010 and the Criminal Finances Act 2017, is likely to succeed in 
dealing with corporate fraud in a financial services context. This excludes an examination of 
its applicability to other offences since these are distinct in substance and therefore merit 
separate investigation. In particular, this article will analyse: 
(a) The problem of “economic crime”;  
(b) The historical development of the “failure to prevent” model of organisational 
liability for bribery;  
(c) Its relative effectiveness in the context of the Bribery Act 2010 and extension in 
the Criminal Finances Act 2017;  
(d) The relative ineffectiveness of the law in combatting fraud in a financial services 
context;  
(e) The appropriateness of the “failure to prevent” model to “economic crime”, 
specifically fraud in a financial services context; and  
(f) Make proposals for reform. 
 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE “FAILURE TO PREVENT” MODEL 
OF ORGANISATIONAL LIABILITY FOR BRIBERY 
The need to reform bribery law 
 
Given that bribery is a form of economic crime, it is of note that this particular offence was 
the subject of reform well in advance of the other forms now more generally identified. In 
this respect, the law of bribery is to be understood as the product of its genealogy, its origins 
and development wholly independent of the evolutionary paths of the law of fraud and other 
economic crimes. Bribery has also been treated in isolation at the international level and this 
distinction is reflected as much in the substance of the offence as in its enforcement
62
 and the 
drivers for reform. Cases involving an offence called bribery first appeared in Star Chamber 
records circa 1550.
63
 The common law offence of bribery of a public official sat alongside a 
number of other offences which prohibited conduct of this nature in highly particularised 
circumstances, for example misconduct in public office
64
 and misconduct by executive and 
administrative officials of the crown.
65
 Having evolved on a case by case basis, the common 
law offence of bribery of a public official encompassed the “receiving or offering [of] any 
                                                             
62 Dealt with below. 
63 J. Lindgren, “The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction” (1993) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 141: 1695 and referring to J.T Noonan Jr’s comprehensive work, Bribes: The 
Intellectual History of A Moral Idea (Diane Publishing Co, 1984). 
64 The Law Commission is currently analysing responses to its second public consultation process with a view to 
proposed reform of this offence, http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/misconduct-in-public-office/ [Accessed 
May 15, 2017]. 
65 See Law Commission, “Misconduct in Public Office, Issues Paper 1”, App. A, Jan 20, 2016, providing a 
detailed account of the historical developments of this offence and related offences. 
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undue reward by or to any person whatsoever, in a public office, in order to influence his 
behaviour in office, and incline him to act contrary the known rules of honesty and 
integrity.”66 As regards its scope, precedent existed for the bribing of privy councillors, 
officers of justice and jurymen
67
 and the elections of overseers of parishes, officers of 
companies and members of parliament.
68
 However, with the growth of commercial activity in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, there was a corresponding increase in corrupt 
behaviour and the reach of the law was extended with the introduction of various statutory 
offences.
69
 The first, the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, was enacted largely in 
response to the revelation of widespread misconduct of local government and other public 
employees within London’s governing body, the Metropolitan Board of Works.70 However, 
this statute did not address the growing problem of corruption in the private sector which was 
undermining confidence in trade and Parliament responded by passing the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1906.
71
 Criminalizing corruption between private individuals, the Act also 
extended the range of public officials who were caught by the law
72
 but was itself limited by 
the requirement that the recipient of the corrupt payment was the “agent” of a “principal”. 
The definition of “agent” was construed within the ordinary meaning of the term, applicable 
to those who acted on behalf of others, and therefore could include employees, directors and 
trustees.
73
 Within a decade, s. 4(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 extended the 
definition of “agent” in the public sector context such that a person serving under any public 
body, whether or not an agent within the accepted meaning, was deemed to be an agent for 
the purposes of the 1906 Act.
74
 Neither the 1889 Act
75
 nor the 1906 Act
76
 provided a 
definition of “corruptly”, an element that was central to the offending behaviour. In this 
respect, the courts relied upon the circular statement provided in Cooper v Slade (1858)
77
 to 
the effect that it meant purposefully doing an act which the law forbids as tending to corrupt. 
Unsurprisingly, this proved problematic in practice and the 1916 Act also created a rebuttable 
presumption of corruption where gifts were made to public officials by those seeking a 
contract from the public body.
78
  
                                                             
66 J.W.C. Turner, Russell on Crime (Stevens, 1964) p.381. 
67 The now defunct offence was referred to as embracery. 
68 W.F. Craies and H.D. Roome, Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases (24th ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1910) p.1195. 
69 R. Chada et al, Bribery: A Compliance Handbook (Bloomsbury Professional, 2014).   
70 R. Chada et al, Bribery: A Compliance Handbook (Bloomsbury Professional, 2014). 
71 The Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 came into force the following year. 
72
 R. Chada et al, Bribery: A Compliance Handbook (Bloomsbury Professional, 2014). 
73 P. Murphy (ed.), Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (Oxford University Press, 2003) B15.13. 
74 P. Murphy (ed.), Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (Oxford University Press, 2003) B15.13. See also Barrett 
[1976] 1 W.L.R. 946. 
75 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, s.1(1) “Every person who shall by himself or by or in conjunction 
with any other person, corruptly solicit or receive, or agree to receive...” and s.1(2) “Every person who shall by 
himself or by or in conjunction with any other person corruptly give, promise or offer...”. 
76 Protection of Corruption Act 1906, s.1(1) “if any agent corruptly accepts or obtains..., or any person 
corruptly gives or agrees to give or offer...”. 
77 Cooper v Slade (1858) VI House of Lords Court (Clark’s) 746, 10 E.R. 1488 at 1499. 
78
 Further to the enactment of Human Rights Act 1998, s.3 enshrining European Convention of Human Rights 
Art. 6(2), this shifts the evidential burden onto the defendant to raise the issue as to whether the gift was 
corruptly made, the burden of proof remaining with the prosecution. 
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Proposals for reform were put forward in the 1970’s following the Poulson scandal,79 the 
Radcliffe-Maud Committee recommending that the presumption of corruption should extend 
to cover elected officials who exercised discretion in areas such as housing and planning
80
 
and the Salmon Commission focusing on public sector issues.
81
 These were not acted upon 
and a further scandal, the infamous “cash for questions” affair involving Mohamed Al-Fayed, 
the then owner of Harrods department store, sparked John Major’s instigation of Lord 
Nolan’s Commission of Inquiry in 1994.82 It was at the suggestion of the Nolan Committee 
Report on Standards in Public Life
83
 that the Law Commission made proposals for reform of 
the bribery offence in 1998.
84
 However, the initial proposals were not adopted, largely due to 
the rejection of the proposed retention of the “agent” and “principal” basis for the offence85 
and reservations as to the alternatives that were subsequently mooted.
86
 Referring the matter 
back for further review, the Law Commission published another report in 2008
87
 and it was 
this that led to the enactment of the Bribery Act 2010. 
 
A number of international initiatives were also emanating from various sources over this 
period and the domestic response to the problem of corruption and bribery must be viewed in 
this broader context. For example, as a member of the EU, the UK was subject to the First 
and Second Protocols to the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ 
Financial Interests
88
 and the Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving Officials 
of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the EU Framework Decision 
of 22 July 2003.
89
 Similarly, the UK ratified the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption
90
 in December 2003 and this necessitated the criminalisation of 
both domestic and public foreign officials when it came into force in April 2004.
91
 In 
December 2005, the United Nations Convention against Corruption came into force 
                                                             
79
 J. Poulson, architect, was convicted of conspiracy to make or receive corrupt gifts in a web of corruption 
extending to 23 local authorities and around 300 individuals including MPs, police officers, health authorities 
and civil servants, see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/15/newsid_4223000/4223045.stm [Accessed May 
22, 2017]. 
80 Radcliffe-Maud Committee on Local Government Rules of Conduct 1974. 
81 Royal Commission (The Salmon Commission) on Standards in Public Life 1976, Cmnd. 6524. 
82 R. Chada et al, Bribery: A Compliance Handbook (Bloomsbury Professional, 2014). 
83 Nolan Committee, Report on Standards in Public Life 1995 (Cm 28501). 
84 Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption (Report No. 248), 3 March 1998. 
85
 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/notes [Accessed 16.10.16], see Summary, para.4. 
86 See the Government’s White Paper “Raising Standards and Upholding Integrity: the Prevention of 
Corruption” (Cm. 4759); Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill Session 2002-03, Report and Evidence HL 
157, HC 705 Dec 2003; The Government Reply to the Report from the Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption 
Bill Session 2002-03 HL 157, HC 705, Cm. 6068 and the Government consultation “Bribery: Reform of the 
Prevention of Corruption Acts and SFO powers in cases of bribery of foreign officials” (2005). 
87 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (Report No. 313), 20 Nov 2008. 
88 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al33019 [Accessed May 22, 2017], the first 
protocol came into force on the 17 October 2002, the second on the 19 May 2009. 
89 R. Chada et al, Bribery: A Compliance Handbook (Bloomsbury Professional, 2014). 
90
 Council of Europe, Treaty No. 173. 
91 http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Default_en.asp [Accessed May 22, 
2017]. 
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following a series of resolutions, declarations and conventions and the launch of the Global 
Programme against Corruption.
92
 This was ratified by the UK in 2006, having signed up at an 
earlier high level conference in 2003.
93
 Further, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), to which the UK acceded in 1961, enacted the Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions in 
1999.
94
 In this respect, the OECD’S Working Group review of our national law found that the 
criminal law’s response to corporate liability was wanting95 and that although there were 
exceptions, our anti-corruption legislation was deficient in that it did not extend the 
jurisdiction of the UK courts to try cases abroad.    
 
Common law precedents for a “failure to prevent” model generally unsuccessful 
The failure to prevent the criminal activities of other persons has not generally been regarded 
as a criminal offence.
96
 There was a common law misdemeanour “misprision of felony”, 
involving a failure to reveal a felony to the authorities which in effect created a duty to reveal 
the commission of a crime. To attract liability it was not necessary to have done anything 
active in the commission of the offence,
97
 however, it was also a misprision to fail to reveal 
another’s intention to commit a future felony,98 which comes very close to an offence of 
failing to prevent a felony. Perhaps understandably, this offence was regarded as 
unreasonably wide for a considerable period of time
99
 such that it came to be regarded as 
“practically obsolete” in the nineteenth century.100 That being said, four prosecutions for the 
failure to report the felony of another were successful in the twentieth century, the last being 
in 1961.
101
 Although it had been suggested that the charge of misprision should only succeed 
on proof that the non-disclosure was for the benefit of the party charged,
102
 this was rejected 
in Wilde [1960].
103
 In Sykes [1961] Lord Denning accepted a number of limitations to 
prosecution for misprision, some of which were based on the nature of the relationship 
                                                             
92
 See the details provided at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ [Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
93 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html [Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
94 http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf [Accessed May 22, 2017]. Art.1 
criminalises the bribing of a foreign public official, Art.9 deals with mutual legal assistance and Art.10 with 
extradition. 
95 http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/34599062.pdf  [Accessed May 22, 2017], 
pp.63 – 66. 
96 It is still a common law offence to refuse to assist a constable who calls for assistance in dealing with a 
breach of the peace, Brown (1841) Car & M 314; Waugh (1976) Times, 1 Oct. 1976. 
97
 Sykes v DPP [1961] 3 W.L.R. 371 (TAC), a person committed an offence if he knew of another’s guilt, and 
could give information that might lead to his arrest for a felony, but omitted to communicate that information 
to some justice of the peace, see JW Cecil Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 1966). 
98 G. Williams, Criminal Law, General Part (Stevens & Sons, 1961) p.423.   
99 G. Williams, Criminal Law, General Part (Stevens & Sons, 1961) p.423, citing the Criminal Law Commissioners 
5th Rep (184) Parl. Pap. xx 36. 
100 G. Williams, Criminal Law, General Part (Stevens & Sons, 1961) p.424, citing Stephen, HCL ii 238. 
101 Casserley, Times, May 28, 1938; Aberg [1948] 1 All E.R. 601, 32 CAR 144 (CCA); Wilde [1960] Criminal Law 
Review 116; Sykes v DPP [1961] 3 W.L.R. 371 (TAC). 
102
 Aberg [1948] 1 All ER 601 and Lord Goddard’s reference to Lord Westbury in Williams v Bayley (1866) L.R. 1 
HL 220. 
103 Wilde [1960] Criminal Law Review 116. 
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between the parties involved which could give rise to a claim of right in good faith, for 
example that between lawyer and client, doctor and patient and clergyman and parishioner.
104
 
In addition, the institutional writers identified it as a misdemeanour to forbear from 
preventing a felony, however, this was regarded as narrower in scope than misprision and 
was long regarded as obsolete.
105
 The offence of misprision of felony, but not misprision of 
treason,
106
 was finally abolished by the Criminal Law Act 1967 which also brought to an end 
the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours, a distinction that had played a 
fundamental part in determining the scope of criminal liability for the misprision offence. The 
Criminal Law Revision Committee report of 1965, upon which the statute was based, had 
rehearsed a number of concerns with the misprision offence.
107
 The Committee noted that the 
offence had no clearly defined limitations and, in particular, dishonesty was not a prerequisite 
to a conviction for the omission to report a felony. In addition, it was suggested that public 
opinion was unlikely to support an offence of refusing to answer police questions about the 
commission of offences and it then rejected the imposition of a general duty to disclose “for 
obvious reasons”.108 Although not clarifying what those obvious reasons were, it has been 
suggested that this approach was based on the criminal law’s general dislike of liability based 
on omissions, a principle that had been cogently argued in the context of rescuers and the 
failure to save or attempt to save those in peril.
109
 This argument was founded primarily on 
the incursion into the individual’s autonomy and liberty that such a duty would pose, noting 
that liability of this nature could arise by chance rather than choice. While supporters of 
social responsibility might have reasoned that a duty to disclose information is a minimal 
interference in comparison, the framers of the Criminal Law Act 1967 nonetheless followed 
the Law Committee’s recommendations.   
 
In other contexts, there have been limited instances in which the common law, in effect, 
imposed criminal liability on individuals for a failure to prevent another’s offending but, 
where it has done so, the construction of the liability incurred is as an accessory to the 
substantive offence.
110
 For example, a jury could infer that a mother intended to encourage or 
assist the sexual assault on her 12 year old son when she failed to prevent him from having 
sexual intercourse with an adult woman. The mother’s liability was based on her present 
knowledge of her son’s age and that he was unable to consent to the act.111 Similarly, in 
Carter v Richardson [1974] the supervisor of a learner-driver who was above the blood-
alcohol limit was found to have aided and abetted the drink-driving offence because he was 
                                                             
104
 Sykes v DPP [1961] 3 W.L.R. 371 (TAC). 
105 G. Williams, Criminal Law, General Part (Stevens & Sons, 1961) p.422 citing Coney (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 557-558 
(CCR). 
106 D. Ormerod, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (Oxford University Press, 2017) A1.16. 
107 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Seventh Report on Felonies and Misdemeanours (1965) (Cmnd. 2659) 
para.39. 
108 S. Wallerstein, “Imposing Obligations to Disclose Information on Non-Suspects” in G.R. Sullivan and I. 
Dennis (eds.) Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms (Hart, 2012).   
109 S. Wallerstein, “Imposing Obligations to Disclose Information on Non-Suspects” in G.R. Sullivan and I. 
Dennis (eds.) Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms (Hart, 2012).   
110
 See for example the discussion by D.J. Baker in G. William’s Textbook of Criminal Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2015) p.610-12. 
111 State v Ainsworth (1993) 426 S.E. 2d 410. 
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aware that the driver had consumed excessive alcohol or was reckless as to whether he had 
done so.
112
 However, the application of this construction to establish a corporate accessorial 
liability, under the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 or the Serious Crime Act 2007, is 
problematic in that proof of some blameworthy mental state, intention, knowledge or 
recklessness, is required. Aside from the statutory exceptions found in relation to corporate 
manslaughter,
113
 the failure to prevent bribery
114
 and tax evasion
115
 the common law will only 
impose corporate culpability if the substantive offence in question has been committed by a 
sufficiently senior controlling officer within the organisation.
116
 Therefore, in order to 
attribute secondary liability to a corporation in this way, it would be necessary to find that an 
individual senior manager/director had been criminally complicit through aiding, abetting, 
counselling or procuring another to commit the crime or in the assisting or encouraging of 
it.
117
   
 
Statutory intervention to impose organisational liability based on failure to act 
 
Modern legislation has imposed a criminal liability for failure to disclose information in two 
key areas. The first relates to acts of terrorism or its funding, for example, under sections 19 
and 21A Terrorism Act 2000, and the second relates to knowledge or suspicion of money 
laundering under sections 330, 331 and 332 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
118
 Application of 
the latter is confined specifically to persons working in the regulated sector where the 
defendant knows, suspects or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting that another 
is engaged in money laundering.
119
 In essence, this imposes a duty to report and the 
“reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting” limb means that a conviction can be based 
on a finding that although the defendant did not suspect laundering activity, he should have 
done. This duty is underpinned by the higher standard of diligence imposed by the Money 
Laundering Regulations 2007 which require comprehensive preventative systems within the 
regulated sector. The offences contained in the Money Laundering Regulations 2007
120
 begin 
to get closer to a “failure to prevent” model by requiring that “relevant persons”121 who are 
acting in the course of business conducted by them in the UK take appropriate steps to detect 
and prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
122
 In terms of the duty this 
imposes, there is a specific requirement to put in place and apply “customer due diligence” 
                                                             
112 Carter v Richardson [1974] R.T.R. 314. 
113 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s.1. 
114
 Bribery Act 2010, s.7. 
115 Criminal Finances Act 2017, Pt.3, ss.45 and 46 
116 Tesco v Natrass [1972] A.C. 153 (HL). 
117 See the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, s.8 and the Serious Crime Act 2007, ss.44-46. 
118 The 2002 Act came into force on February 24, 2003 and money laundering activity taking place prior to its 
commencement is subject to prosecution under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for non-drugs offences or the 
Drug Trafficking Act 1994 for property derived from drugs offences. 
119 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, ss.330, 331, 332. 
120 S.I. 2007, No 2157, in accordance with the EU 3rd Money Laundering Directive 2005, to be superseded by 
the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (EU) 2015/849 which took effect on 26 June 2015, supplemented by 
the Reg. (EU) 2016/675 of 14 July 2016, which must be transposed into national law by 26 June 2017. 
121 Money Laundering Regulations 2007, reg.3. 
122 D. Ormerod, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (OUP 2015), B21.32 emphasis added. 
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measures with an accompanying duty to effect internal controls, training and monitoring 
systems that are appropriate to the business in question, determined on a risk-based approach, 
and to report suspicious activities. Non-compliance gives rise to a civil penalty
123
 and the 
offence is committed if the relevant person and/or regulated business fails to comply with one 
of the specified duties
124
 although there is a defence that the accused took all reasonable steps 
and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the regulatory offence.
125
 The corporate 
criminal behaviour is therefore the failure to comply with the detailed administrative 
requirements stipulated in the Regulations, this being the substantive offence. Accordingly, to 
describe the offence in terms of the failure to prevent money laundering affords considerable 
artistic licence as regards the specific underlying basis for the attribution of fault. Indeed, 
veering to the other extreme, the Financial Conduct Authority’s (“FCA”) recent report of 
Barclays’ failure to comply with the enhanced due diligence requirements,126 in a £1.88bn 
transaction undertaken for a number of politically exposed persons, described the conduct as 
a failure to “minimise a risk that it might be used to facilitate financial crime”127 while the 
popular press described a record fine “for secret deals with mega-rich”, omitting any express 
reference to money-laundering or the Regulations themselves.
128
   
 
As regards the duty to disclose, it is suggested that this is legitimated by the fact that those 
who are under the duty, i.e. who work in the regulated sector, actively help, even if 
unknowingly, to launder money and they are in a special relationship which gives rise to 
concerns of conflicts of interests.
129
 Accordingly, legislation and regulation in this area seek 
to strike a balance between the duties owed to the client and those owed to the state
130
 while 
giving effect to EU law.
131
 However, it must be remembered that liability for failure to 
disclose the offence of another and liability for the failure to prevent the commission of an 
offence by another are ontologically distinct. While the former imposes a responsive and 
arguably minimal obligation on the duty holder to report to the relevant authority, by 
comparison the latter imposes a potentially onerous duty to actively construct such 
prophylactic measures as may be considered reasonable in the circumstances.   
 
The development of the “failure to prevent” model for bribery 
 
The Law Commission’s 2008 Report on Reforming Bribery naturally acknowledged both 
                                                             
123 Money Laundering Regulations 2007, reg.42. 
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125 Money Laundering Regulations 2007, regs.45(4) and 47. 
126 Money Laundering Regulations 2007, reg.14(1). 
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national and international obligations and influences.
132
 It recognised that the creation of a 
new criminal offence incurred a heavy burden of justification, which it sought to meet in the 
following way.
133
 It concluded that the criminal law needed strengthening in preference to 
modifying the civil law because an actionable damage may not be suffered when bribery is 
committed
134
. This finding directly reflected the OECD’s requirement that criminal liability 
be imposed where there is no effective “tort” of bribery or special administrative sanction 
aimed at its prevention.
135
 Of course, there are considerable limitations to bringing any civil 
action for this type of activity in English law which are primarily consequent on the 
construction of the wrongdoing itself and context in which it takes place, typically within the 
tight confines of an agency or fiduciary relationship. Accordingly, the civil law recognises 
that a principal may suffer an actionable loss as a result of his agent’s breach of fiduciary 
duty or his unjust enrichment. Of note, the giving or the receiving of a bribe is not a distinct 
“tort” in itself, but is one of any number of different activities that could compromise the 
fiduciary duty or give rise to an unjust enrichment.
136
 Although the fiduciary duties 
themselves are prophylactic in nature, there must be an identifiable and quantifiable loss for a 
claim of this nature to be actionable and, while the value of the secret commission itself may 
be readily established, quantifying the extent of the loss caused by the fraud is inevitably 
fraught with difficulty. Similarly, although liability for conduct of this type may be extended 
to third parties, this would need to be established on the basis of an unlawful means 
conspiracy involving proof of an agreement to some active or passive concerted action to 
cause damage
137
 to another by unlawful means.
138
 Accordingly, persons with locus standi to 
bring a civil action for bribery are strictly limited to those who have suffered a demonstrable 
direct financial loss, identified targets of an unlawful means conspiracy and/or those to whom 
injury was reasonably foreseeable in the course of the agreed activity. With the latter 
constraint in mind, the Law Commission concluded that a corporation, and those acting on its 
behalf, are better placed to ensure that the damage done by tolerating bribery is reduced or 
eliminated worldwide – especially in relation to overseas trade.139 
 
Militating further towards the invocation of a criminal liability, the Law Commission also 
observed that the ambition of the EU Conventions was not adequately reflected in the civil 
jurisdiction, where the aim of the law of tort is primarily to restore parties to the financial 
position they were in before the loss.
140
 The Law Commission also rejected the possibility 
that minority shareholders could bring an action against the corporate tolerance of unethical 
practice, referring to potential obstacles and the lack of evidence that actions of this nature 
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134 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.13. 
135 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.68. 
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are, or could be, used effectively to hold company Boards to account.
141
 Thus, to accord with 
the spirit of our international obligations, the UK needed to adopt a more preventative 
approach by providing an enhanced means of deterrence and punishment to companies 
indifferent to the commission of bribery.
142
 Further, the preference for criminalization over 
regulation was underlined by reference to the character of the misconduct in question, 
contrasting “parking offences, many environmental or licensing offences, and offences 
connected with, for example, failures to file accounts in a particular form” as examples of 
regulatory offences.
143
 Providing further elucidation, the Law Commission opined that 
regulatory offences often target conduct that involves no harm in itself but which is 
conducive to harmful, risky or wrongful outcomes, for example parking on a double yellow 
line.
144
 In support, three of the four consultees who responded did not believe that regulation 
enforced by non-criminal sanctions was the best way to address lack of corporate 
supervision.
145
   
 
THE RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FAILURE TO PREVENT MODEL IN 
THE CONTEXT OF THE BRIBERY ACT 2010 AND ITS EXTENSION IN THE 
CRIMINAL FINANCES ACT 2017 
 
Structure of legislation 
 
The common law bribery offence and the patchwork of statutory provisions were repealed 
when the Bribery Act 2010 came into force on 1 July 2011. Although the Act retains the 
distinctions between active and passive bribery,
146
 liability is not limited by reference to the 
particular status of the individuals involved and is determined by nature of the consequent act 
or that intended. Accordingly, the offer and/or acceptance of the advantage, financial or 
other, are deemed criminal bribery if done with an intention that the recipient will perform a 
relevant function or activity improperly.
147
 The territorial limitation is addressed by s. 6 
which specifically criminalises the bribery of a foreign public official and corporate 
responsibility is set out at s. 7 with the failure to prevent bribery offence. The Bribery Act 
“failure to prevent” offence,148 with the accompanying adequate procedures/due diligence 
defence,
149
 is, however, very different to previous common law attempts to develop liability 
based on a failure to prevent criminal acts and can instead be seen quite simply as the 
application of a well-established model of regulatory liability that developed in parallel. It is 
                                                             
141
 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.68. 
142 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008). There are 4 European Conventions requiring liability for bribery 
and an inadequate failure to supervise an employee (or other person) who has committed bribery:  Art.3(2) 
Second Protocol of the Convention on the Protection of the European Community’s Financial Interests; 
Art.18(2) Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption; Art.5(2) European Council’s Framework 
Decision 2003/568/JHA; OECD Antibribery Convention.  
143 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.17. 
144 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.18. 
145 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.70. 
146 Criminalized at Bribery Act 2010, ss.1 and 2 respectively. 
147
 Bribery Act 2010, s.3. 
148 Bribery Act 2010, s.7(1). 
149 Bribery Act 2010, s.7(2). 
18 
 
also very different to the failure-based offences in the Money Laundering Regulations in that 
it does not turn on a failure to comply with a detailed framework of administrative measures 
but is framed specifically on the failure to prevent an employee or associate committing the 
substantive bribery offence.
150
 Further, in relation to the corporate bribery offence, the 
company itself must determine what internal procedures need to be invoked in order meet the 
adequacy test for prevention encompassed in the statutory “due diligence” defence, there are 
no explicitly prescribed measures.
151
 The novelty of the Act therefore lies in the creation of a 
serious corporate offence combined with a defence that is effectively the demonstration of 
regulatory-type compliance, this construction now blurring the criminal and the regulatory 
categories in a penal statute.
152
   
 
Evaluation of the Bribery Act 2010 
 
Five years on, there are mixed messages as to whether the Bribery Act is proving a success.  
For example, some commentators have described a “step change in anti-bribery compliance 
standards”153 and note that, in spite of predictions that UK companies would be seriously 
disadvantaged on the global stage, the UK economy is the strongest in Europe.
154
 Similarly, 
in terms of awareness and impact of the new provisions, a survey conducted in January 2014 
found that 66% of SMEs had either heard of the Bribery Act 2010 or were aware of its 
corporate liability for failure to prevent bribery, with that awareness increasing slightly 
among those exporting to less developed regions, including the Middle East, Asia, Africa and 
South and Central America.
155
 Of the 66% aware of the Act, 81% knew that the Act has 
extra-territorial reach and 72% thought that their company had sufficient understanding to be 
able to implement adequate anti-bribery procedures.
156
 Impressive as this may sound, put 
another way it meant that less than half of the SMEs surveyed had enough knowledge to take 
sufficient steps some two and half years after the Act came into force. Of some concern is the 
report published in October 2016 by Professor Kakabadse, Henley Business School, which 
                                                             
150 Bribery Act 2010, s.1 or s.6. 
151 Bribery Act 2010, s.7(2).  As regards guidance in relation to this matter see 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf [Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
152 S. Gentle, “The Bribery Act 2010” [2011] Criminal Law Review 101. 
153 http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2015/april/five-years-ofn-the-bribery-act-has-led-to--a-step-change-
in-anti-bribery-compliance-standards-says-expert/ [Accessed May 22, 2017], by B. Vitou, an anti-bribery expert 
at Pinsent Masons, LLP. 
154
 https://www.icsa.org.uk/ireland/knowledge-and-guidance/governance-and-directors/report-on-awareness-
and-impact-of-the-uk-bribery-act-2010-among-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-published [Accessed May 
22, 2017]. 
155 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS, which became the Department for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy in July 2016) and the Ministry of Justice, “Report on awareness and impact of the UK 
Bribery Act 2010 among small and medium sized enterprises”, 25 Sept. 2015, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/impact-of-the-bribery-act-2010-on-smes [Accessed May 22, 
2017]. 
156 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS, which became the Department for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy in July 2016) and the Ministry of Justice, “Report on awareness and impact of the UK 
Bribery Act 2010 among small and medium sized enterprises”, 25 Sept. 2015, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/impact-of-the-bribery-act-2010-on-smes [Accessed May 22, 
2017]. 
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suggests that bribery is a “way of life” for British companies working in emerging markets, 
with an estimated 85% of managers forced to resort to it in order to do business, often with 
the tacit permission of their chief executives.
157
 While acknowledging that the robust 
penalties contained in the UK Bribery Act and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act “bring 
fear to boards”, he suggested that they are also creating a new class of “fall guys”. These 
findings, based on a 12-year inquiry comprising of “intimate discussions” with over 900 
executives,
158
 are in contrast to other recent reports which indicate an increased awareness of 
bribery which may be attributable to the numerous high-profile corruption cases involving 
major US and European corporations
159
 or the recent corporate investigations which are being 
undertaken by the Serious Fraud Office in the UK. According to the report published by 
PWC as a part of its Global Crime Survey 2016,
160
 UK respondents reported that the overall 
level of bribery and corruption has fallen since 2014 with 98% stating that their company’s 
management were clear in their condemnation of the practice, and 94% believing that their 
company would rather have a business transaction fail than resort to bribery to secure it.
161
 
On a global perspective, the outlook is less optimistic with Ernst & Young’s report showing 
no improvement since 2014 and 39% of those surveyed perceiving that bribery is widespread 
in their countries. In the emerging markets this equated to 51% of respondents thinking that 
bribery occurs widely and in the developed markets 21% reported that such behaviour is 
widespread.   
  
Notwithstanding, the perception of a high incidence of corrupt behaviour in both developed 
and emerging markets, there has been just one conviction for the corporate offence of failure 
to prevent bribery
162
 to date and three Deferred Prosecution Agreements.
163
 Deferred 
                                                             
157 See the media reports at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/10/26/bribery-a-way-of-life-for-
companies-operating-in-emerging-market/ [Accessed May 22, 2017]; 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d44e6b4f-df0f-409f-ab82-b73654b1fdc7 [Accessed May22, 
2017]. 
158
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/10/26/bribery-a-way-of-life-for-companies-operating-in-
emerging-market/ [Accessed May 22, 2017];  http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d44e6b4f-df0f-
409f-ab82-b73654b1fdc7 [Accessed May22, 2017]. 
159 For example in the Ernst & Young Global Fraud Survey 2016 and commenting in particular on the worsening 
view in developed markets, at http://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/assurance/fraud-investigation---dispute-
services/ey-global-fraud-survey-2016 [Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
160 http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/advisory/consulting/forensics/economic-crime-survey.html [Accessed 
May 22, 2017]. 
161 http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/advisory/consulting/forensics/economic-crime-survey.html [Accessed 
May 22, 2017]. 
162 Sweett Group PLC pleaded guilty to the corporate offence on 18 Dec. 2015, contrary to Bribery Act 2010, 
s.7. 
163 On 30 Nov. 2015, Sir B. Leveson approved the first DPA between the Serious Fraud Office and ICBC Standard 
Bank Plc for acting with its sister company, Stanbic Bank Tanzania Ltd. to bribe Tanzanian government officials, 
see for example the report by Ashurst LLP on Global ABC and investigations, 18 Jan. 2016 at 
https://www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?id_Content=12763 [Accessed May 22, 2017]. The second DPA was 
approved on July 8, 2016, also by Leveson LJ, the counterparty is a UK SME that cannot be named because of 
ongoing related legal proceedings and is therefore referred to as XYZ Ltd, see  
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/07/08/sfo-secures-second-dpa/ [Accessed May 22, 2017]. The third DPA was 
agreed on Jan. 17, 2017 with Rolls Royce, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2017/01/17/sfo-completes-497-25m-
deferred-prosecution-agreement-rolls-royce-plc/ [Accessed May 16, 2017]. A fourth DPA was agreed on Apr. 
10, 2017 between the SFO and Tesco Stores Ltd but the details of the criminal activity to which this relates are 
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Prosecution Agreements (DPA) became part of the Serious Fraud Office’s (SFO) 
enforcement armoury in February 2014 and can be invoked, with judicial approval, once 
criminal proceedings have been instituted against a corporation. In essence, the effect is that 
the prosecution is deferred on terms, such as the payment of a financial penalty, 
compensation and the implementation of a compliance programme. If the terms of the 
agreement are met within the specified time, the proceedings are discontinued.
164
 Further, in 
October 2014 sentencing guidelines on financial penalties for companies convicted of 
economic crimes came into force and these will also inform the level of any financial penalty 
that forms part of a DPA.
165
 Thus, for example, in February 2016, Sweett Group PLC was 
fined £1.4m on conviction
166
 and, in November 2015, Standard Bank was given a US Dollar 
16.8m fine as a term of its DPA.
167
  
 
The lack of prosecutions for the s. 7 corporate failure to prevent bribery to date is not 
necessarily indicative of particularly low incidents of economic crime of this nature. It must 
be remembered that the Bribery Act 2010 came into force just over 5 years ago, does not 
have retrospective effect and the corporate model of criminal liability it employs is an 
innovation lacking any equivalent in the earlier anti-bribery regime. The provisions can only 
be invoked for failures occurring since July 2011. Accordingly, in January 2016, in the case 
referred to as “chickengate”, Smith & Ouzman Ltd. was convicted of 3 counts of corruption 
but, because the bribes had taken place between November 2006 and December 2010, this 
was prosecuted under s. 1(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.
168
 This corporate 
conviction, the first for offences involving bribery of foreign public officials, would have 
been established through the longstanding common law identification principle, with both the 
Chairman and the Sales and Marketing Director having been found guilty of the offences.
169
  
Similarly, investigations of this nature are inevitably long-running. The Smith & Ouzman 
case, for example, was concluded in January 2016 having been opened in October 2010, the 
first hearing not taking place until some 3 years later, in October 2013. The same can be said 
even in cases where the defendant organisation self-reports to the SFO. Thus, for example, 
where Sweett Group Plc had self-reported in July 2014, it was not until some 17 months later, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
currently the subject of reporting restrictions, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2017/04/10/sfo-agrees-deferred-
prosecution-agreement-with-tesco/ [Accessed May 16, 2017]. 
164 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sch.17 and The Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, Pt.11. 
165 https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Fraud_bribery_and_money_laundering_offences_-_Definitive_guideline.pdf [Accessed May 
22, 2017]. 
166 With an additional £851, 152.23 confiscated and £95,031.97 ordered in costs, 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/02/19/sweett-group-plc-sentenced-and-ordered-to-pay-2-3-million-after-
bribery-act-conviction/ [Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
167 It also had to pay back the bribe of US $6million plus interest, disgorge the profit of $8.4million and pay the 
SFO’s legal costs. See https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2015/11/30/sfo-agrees-first-uk-dpa-with-standard-bank/ 
[Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
168 http://www.printweek.com/print-week/news/1148334/smith-ouzman-denies-paying-gbp400k-bribes-
chickengate [Accessed May 22, 2017]. The case became known as “chickengate” because of the frequency 
with which “chicken” as a pseudonym for “bribe” was used in the correspondence relied upon in evidence at 
trial. 
169 https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2014/12/22/uk-printing-company-two-men-found-guilty-corruption-trial/ 
[Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
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on the 18 December 2015, that a guilty plea was finally entered.
170
 Although the company 
had invited the involvement of the SFO, it appears that the company ceased to be considered 
co-operative on the basis that, following legal advice, it had continued to undertake its own 
independent investigation.
171
 However, in the Standard Bank case, where the defendant 
company was seen to co-operate sufficiently to be granted a DPA on 30 November 2015, the 
self-referral had been made after suspicions were raised in March 2013, some 2 years and 8 
months earlier.   
 
While only 2 corporate proceedings had been brought under the Bribery Act 2010 by the end 
of 2015, the SFO had opened 16 new investigations that year and there are currently a 
number of ongoing inquiries which relate to activity preceding and post-dating the coming 
into force of the Bribery Act 2010. These include Airbus Group, Alstom, ENRC, FH 
Bertling, GlaxoSmithKline, KBR and Unaoil.
172
 Perhaps indicative of the growing appetite 
for robust anti-bribery action, in May 2015 the International Corruption Unit was created as 
part of the UK Anti-Corruption Plan with a view to a significant increase in investigations 
and a higher likelihood of prosecution.
173
 It is reasonable to expect that the increasing 
publicity of investigative actions and enforcement measures being taken, in increasingly 
high-profile corporate cases, will continue to diminish the knowledge and awareness deficit 
that has been identified in relation to the anti-bribery offences. Publicity will also serve to 
illustrate, as it did in the Standard Bank proceedings, that a purely tick-box approach to 
corporate anti-bribery and corruption policy is not enough to demonstrate that due diligence 
has been exercised and to avoid penalty.   
 
The “failure to prevent” model not only side-steps the problematic attribution of corporate 
fault inherent in the identification doctrine, the placing of the evidential onus on the corporate 
defendant to show due diligence also goes a long way to overcome practical difficulties that 
are particularly exacerbated in the corporate context. The problem of evidence is further 
alleviated with the availability of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, and accompanying 
opportunity for a reduction in penalty, which serves as a strong incentive to self-report when 
companies discover that their anti-bribery regime has been ineffective. 
Further development of model in the Criminal Finances Act 2017 
The corporate offence for failure to prevent offshore tax evasion introduced by the Criminal 
Finances Act 2017 goes further than the model in the Bribery Act in two important 
respects
174
. First, the substantive bribery offence is committed by the employee of, or person 
associated with, the commercial organisation itself and the imposition of corporate culpability 
                                                             
170 See the discussion in Ashurst LLP, “Bribery and corruption; what now for 2016?”, 18 Jan. 2016 at 
https://www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?id_Content=12763 [Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
171 https://www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?id_Content=12763 [Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
172 https://www.sfo.gov.uk/our-cases/ [Accessed May 16, 2016]. 
173 http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/economic-crime/international-corruption-
unit-icu [Accessed May 22, 2017]. This combined the remits of the Metropolitan Police Proceeds of Corruption 
Unit, the City of London Police Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit and elements of the National Crime Agency 
Economic Crime Command. 
174 Compare Criminal Finances Act 2017, Pt 3, ss.45 and 46 with Bribery Act 2010, s.7. 
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for “failure to prevent” rests on a 2-step process. In contrast, corporate liability for failure to 
prevent the facilitation of tax evasion is premised on a substantive offence being committed 
by a client of the firm and requires a 3-step process. In the first step, it must be established 
that there is a substantive criminal offence committed at taxpayer level, for example the 
common law crime of cheating the public revenue, or conspiracy to do so, or one of the range 
of statutory fraudulent evasion offences.
175
 The second step requires that a person associated 
with the company, acting in his professional capacity, has criminally facilitated the taxpayer’s 
evasion of tax. This may be any offence pursuant to which a person is knowingly concerned, 
for example the fraudulent evasion of income
176
 or other form of tax, or dishonestly taking 
“steps with a view” to tax evasion,177 or through established “aiding,  abetting, counselling or 
procuring” principles of secondary criminal liability.178 The  consequential corporate liability 
is predicated on the third step of proof of substantive criminal activity by both the taxpayer 
and the associated person providing services for or on behalf of the corporation, though 
neither the prosecution nor the conviction of either individual are prerequisites. In this 
respect, HMRC’s stated policy is to deal with fraud by using Civil Investigation of Fraud 
procedures, preferring the encouragement of full and honest voluntary disclosure under 
Contractual Disclosure Facility arrangements and the subsequent imposition of civil 
penalties.
179
 From 1 January 2017, the civil penalties were extended to enablers of the 
offshore tax evasion.
180
 
 
In that a finding of corporate liability for “failure to prevent” does not rest on criminal action 
being taken in relation to the underlying substantive tax offences of the taxpayer and the 
enabler, this approach accords with that taken to criminal liability for a corporate failure to 
prevent bribery.  However, given the shift from a 2-step to a 3-step approach in the latter 
context, it may be argued that corporate liability for tax evasion is even more remote than that 
established under the Bribery Act,
181
 with one of the offenders being a party not once but 
twice removed from the organisation itself. Further, unlike the corporate failure to prevent 
bribery offence,
182
 there is no requirement to show that the individual agent facilitating the 
evasion was acting for the benefit of the corporation. The rationale for the development of the 
“failure to prevent” model of corporate liability in both contexts is said to be that it 
incentivises organisations to take reasonable steps, and put in place adequate procedures, to 
                                                             
175 See, for example, Value Added Tax Act 1994, s.72; Taxes Management Act 1970, s.106A or ss.106B to 106H 
as inserted by Finance Act 2016, s.166. 
176 Finance Act 2000, s.144. 
177 See, for example, Value Added Tax Act 1994, s.72 and the Taxes Management Act 1970, s.106A, which 
make it an offence to dishonestly “take steps with a view to” or be “knowingly concerned in” the evasion. 
178 HMRC, “Tackling tax evasion: Government guidance for the corporate offence of failure to prevent the 
criminal facilitation of tax evasion”, Draft Government Guidance, Oct. 2016; Criminal Finance Act 2017, 
ss.45(4) and 45(5).  
179 HMRC, “Code of Practice 9, HM Revenue and Customs investigations where we suspect tax fraud”, June 
2014. 
180 Finance Bill 2016, s.162 and Sch.20. Penalties can be incurred of up to 100% of the tax they helped to evade 
or £3,000, whichever is the highest. 
181 Bribery Act 2010, s.7. 
182 Bribery Act 2007, ss. 7(1)(a) and (b). 
23 
 
promote corporate good governance.
183
 Thus, mirroring the approach taken in the Bribery 
Act,
184
 a due diligence defence is available to corporations who have taken reasonable steps 
to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion by their associates.
185
 Whether or not the steps taken 
were reasonable will be a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis.   
 
RELATIVE INEFFECTIVENESS OF LAW IN COMBATTING FRAUD IN A 
FINANCIAL SERVICES CONTEXT 
In contrast to the relative effectiveness of the “failure to prevent” model in addressing bribery 
at a corporate level in the context of the Bribery Act 2010, the experience of the law in 
tackling fraud at a corporate level has been disappointing despite the considerable efforts that 
have devoted to this in terms of financial services regulation and the generality of the reforms 
made by the Fraud Act 2006. Whereas it has been seen that there is cause for optimism that 
levels of bribery might be falling, fraud appears to be on the increase, and the estimates fail to 
include issues that might potentially involve fraud, such as off-balance sheet finance and mis-
selling of financial services products, because of how these have been addressed. This section 
seeks to analyse why the law on fraud has been relatively ineffective. 
Inadequacy of civil law 
Much of the argument for the reform of the law on bribery turned on the inadequacy of the 
civil law to address the problem and, in particular, the obstacles that deterred individual 
claimants from pursuing a remedy in tort. Civil law has likewise proven ineffective in 
redressing corporate fraud, indeed that it not its purpose. The purpose of civil law is 
quintessentially to provide a fair outcome between the parties, typically involving 
compensation for loss; it is not to stigmatize or deter conduct and does not take into account 
the wider impact of conduct beyond the parties themselves. To evaluate its efficacy 
potentially requires consideration of a number of areas of law,
186
 but principally the tort of 
deceit,
187
 which is the closest that English tort law comes to a claim in fraud; and a claim for 
fraudulent misrepresentation in contract law, since victims of fraud, unlike victims of bribery, 
are frequently involved in a contractual relationship with the perpetrator. A claim for deceit is 
difficult. First, the claimant not only has to shoulder the burden of proof but that evidential 
burden is high since causing loss is central to any claim.
188
 Second, the claimant would need 
to quantify the loss sustained in financial terms. Third, the claimant making a civil claim 
must also prove that the defendant knew that the representation was false, did not believe it 
was true or was reckless as to whether it was true or not.
189
 The most problematic of these is 
likely to involve quantifying the loss, though losses from fraud may in some circumstances 
be easier to calculate than those flowing from the loss of a contract due to bribery. In 
                                                             
183 HMRC “Tackling offshore tax evasion: a new corporate criminal offence of failure to prevent the facilitation 
of evasion”, (Consultation document, 16 July 2015), paras.2.17 and 2.18, p.10. 
184 Bribery Act 2010, s.7(2). 
185 Criminal Finance Act 2017, s.45(2). 
186 P. McGrath, Commercial Fraud and Civil Practice (Oxford University Press, 2008) p.3. 
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 Leni Gas and Oil Investments Ltd v Malta Oil Pty Ltd [2014] E.W.H.C. 893. 
188 P. McGrath, Commercial Fraud and Civil Practice (Oxford University Press, 2008) p.3.    
189 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337. 
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contrast, since the enactment of the Fraud Act 2006, the criminal law has deliberately avoided 
the need for proof of a consequential effect, drafting the offence in inchoate terms and 
premising liability on the dishonest intention of the defendant rather than the practical effect 
on the victim.
190
 A contractual claim based on misrepresentation may be made where the 
victim was induced to enter into the contract as a result. If the misrepresentation is fraudulent 
(or indeed negligent), the contract is vitiated and the claimant may claim both rescission and 
damages.
191
 Again, the victim would need to finance any legal action and bears the burden of 
proof. In the case of small value frauds (or indeed negligent acts or omissions), often 
perpetrated in high quantity against numerous victims, the cost and time involved in bringing 
an individual claim are likely to be disproportionately high and, even if successful, is likely to 
outweigh any perceived benefit by way of award of damages and costs even if successful.
192
 
It is possible that much of the financial misconduct that has come to light over the past couple 
of decades, involving the so-called mis-selling type, has taken place under such 
circumstances. Ultimately, however, the tort of deceit and rescission/ damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentation still fail to capture the potentially vast but incalculable collateral damage 
that may be caused indirectly to the market by fraud and in economic terms it is this need to 
minimise this social harm that justifies the use of the criminal law instead. 
Ad hoc and fragmented criminal law response to fraud 
Fraud is different to bribery and most other offences in that it is not a criminal activity in 
itself but the way in which an otherwise lawful activity is performed; it is therefore 
potentially very broad in its scope. Its distinct nature poses unique problems in addressing 
it.
193
  Bribery is specific conduct that is capable of being narrowly defined and its legal 
evolution is characteristic of the criminal law’s historic tendency to draft in the form of 
numerous highly-particularised offences.
194
 Perhaps surprisingly, there was no general and 
overarching fraud offence until the Fraud Act 2006 came into force on 15
th
 January 2007. 
Instead, there was a patchwork quilt of specialist branches of law, such as company law and 
financial services law, which were substantially intended to address issues of scandal and 
fraud,
195
 and a few specific offences of more general application, for example, the deception-
                                                             
190 The Fraud Act 2006 repealed a number of deception offences contained in the Theft Acts of 1968 and 1978, 
effectively making fraud a “conduct” crime as opposed to a “result” crime. 
191 Misrepresentation Act 1967, s.2(1). 
192
  An example of the problems of large scale group actions generally can be seen in relation to the litigation 
over a Royal Bank of Scotland rights issue, where investors claimed compensation under s. 90 Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000, see LexisNexis Guest Blogger “Another skirmish over privilege in the RBS Rights 
Issue Litigation” http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/dr/another-skirmish-over-privilege-in-the-rbs-rights-issue-
litigation/ [Accessed June 6, 2017] and M. Walters “News focus: Funders helped the RBS fight” Law Society 
Gazette 5th June 2017. 
193 See below ““Failure to prevent” inappropriate where corporate rather than individual dishonesty”. 
194 See “The Historical Development of the “Failure to Prevent” Model of Organisational Liability for Bribery” 
above. 
195 For example, much early companies’ legislation, notably the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, was a 
response to often quite crude forms of fraud and may actually have worsened the problem, see S.F. Copp, 
“Limited Liability and Freedom”, Ch. 8 in S.F. Copp (ed.) “The Legal Foundations of Free Markets” (London: 
Institute of Economic Affairs, 2008) at 173. 
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type offences under the Theft Acts 1968 and 1978.
196
 The Fraud Act 2006 replaced most of 
the specific offences that pre-dated it, but left company law and financial services law – and 
their voluminous and complex regulatory architecture,
197
 essentially untouched. This 
included a raft of highly particularised criminal offences and specialist regulatory agencies 
armed with enforcement powers,
198
 such as the FCA and PRA who now regulate the financial 
and banking sectors. Consequently, the Fraud Act 2006 did not bring about the sea-change in 
the law’s response to fraud that the Bribery Act 2010 has brought to bribery. Most obviously, 
it did not contain a bespoke model to deal with corporate fraud and left the attribution of 
liability subject to the pre-existing but problematic common law identification principle. It 
also left in its wake a perception that regulatory issues were somehow a lesser and separate 
category from fraud which might be perceived as “real crime” and a question mark over 
whether conduct in a regulated industry, such as financial services, should be treated as a 
matter of regulation or true fraud in the event of a conflict – and as to which authority, 
general or regulatory – should address it. 
Financial services regulation potentially satisfies compensatory and deterrent goals 
This article has demonstrated that if mis-selling in financial services were to be seen as a 
matter of fraud, this would considerably increase the volume of identified fraud in the UK. 
The authors have made out the economic case for criminalising financial crime elsewhere.
199
 
Robust intervention – whether through regulation or generic criminal law - can be justified on 
the basis that this is a highly-specialized market in which consumers typically lack 
sophistication. Most will have little or no past knowledge or experience to inform their 
decision-making and will rely instead on the information disseminated by the product or 
service provider within the confines of a relationship in which the consumer has scant 
bargaining power. In economic terms, they experience judgment problems that may justify 
state intervention;
200
 the imbalance in knowledge, information asymmetry, gives rise to a risk 
that the provider provides false or misleading information.
201
 Regulation is justified in such 
circumstances to deter the systematic production of misinformation, to avoid the making of 
                                                             
196 Examples include Theft Act 1968, s.15 obtaining property by deception; s.16 obtaining a pecuniary 
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197 See, for example, S. Copp and A. Cronin, “The failure of criminal law to control the use of off balance sheet 
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socially wasteful investments; and to discourage transactions that fail to allocate resources 
efficiently.
202
 In addition to such problems of an economic nature, many financial products 
have a relatively long duration such that problems are likely only to manifest long after the 
initial enquiry and purchase stage of the contract, albeit with potentially drastic consequences 
for the consumer,
203
 which may give rise to a variety of evidential and practical problems, 
e.g. where there is a corporate reorganisation and the original transacting party cannot be held 
liable. Such issues have led to a range of consumer protection responses, of which the 
regulatory bodies are one.  
 
In relation to the mis-selling scandals involving financial products and derivatives, the FCA 
is the empowered enforcer under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA), a qualifying body 
under both the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UTCCR)
204
 and the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
205
 In additional to the general law of contract, the 
FCA’s Principles for Businesses oblige regulated firms to act fairly. Principle 1 demands that 
a firm conducts its business with integrity while Principle 6 requires it to “pay due regard to 
the interests of its customers and treat them fairly.” Principle 7 requires the firm to “pay due 
regard to the information needs of its clients and communicate information to them in a way 
which is clear, fair and not misleading” and Principle 9 stipulates that the firm takes 
reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice and discretionary decisions for any 
customer entitled to rely on its judgement. In practice, it is this principle-based approach to 
regulation that has provided the gateway for consumer redress in relation to mis-selling
206
 as 
this is far less susceptible to circumvention by contract law and complex legal processes 
which have been used to challenge the firms’ application of highly detailed and technical 
rules.
207
 The consumer receives redress in the form of compensation while the regulated firm 
is fined for a regulatory breach. These Principles can be seen to seek to address issues of 
judgement problems and information asymmetry and combine the need for a civil law 
compensatory approach with the criminal law’s need for deterrence and stigmatization. 
Whether these later goals are adequately served by these mechanisms is evaluated further 
below. 
 
Insufficient stigma/ deterrence with regulatory enforcement 
 
By virtue of its distinct history and genealogy, bribery has been subject to different 
institutional enforcement and procedures than other economic misconduct committed in the 
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commercial arena. This distinction is not the result of any considered theory or predetermined 
plan but essentially derives from the fact that the majority of bribery and overseas corruption 
cases happen to have involved the activities of companies that happen to be unregulated and 
therefore fall under the remit of the Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) and the Crown Prosecution 
Service (“CPS”).208 In contrast, the mis-selling cases that have hit the headlines to date 
happen to have occurred predominantly in the regulated financial sector where investigatory 
and enforcement powers are bestowed upon the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) and 
the Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”).209 Consequently, at the institutional level, 
bribery appears to be regarded a far more serious infringement than economic crime 
involving fraud; bribery has always been a crime subject to prosecution while corporate 
frauds, such as mis-selling, are conceived as a regulatory breach. The respective gravity of 
the misconduct in question has not been determined by reference to the activity itself, but by 
association with the particular enforcement agency and enforcement process invoked.  
 
This position gives rise to some anomalies in practice, as is illustrated by the case of JLT 
Speciality Ltd. which was fined by the FCA in December 2013 for regulatory non-
compliance by way of its failure to have adequate procedures in place to prevent bribery, thus 
breaching the FCA’s general principles.210 Conceived as a compliance breach, this treatment 
accords with the aim of the FCA, to “make sure that financial markets work well so that 
consumers get a fair deal”, ensuring that “the financial industry is run with integrity”, that 
“firms provide consumers with appropriate products and services” and that “consumers can 
trust that firms have their best interests at heart”.211 In different circumstances212 the same 
failure, with the same degree of corporate “negligence”, would amount to the commission of 
the serious criminal offence contained in the Bribery Act 2010.
213
  
The FCA has a wide range of enforcement powers which are regulatory, civil and criminal in 
nature, however, there has been arguably little in the recent past to distinguish conduct which 
falls short of a minor disclosure requirement and that which is tantamount to criminal fraud. 
For example, where a fine was imposed on a firm for mis-selling complex investments to 
customers, the FCA’s Upper Tribunal finding was phrased in the language of a “failure to 
take reasonable care to ensure that its recommendations to customers to invest [in this 
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product] were suitable, having regard to what it knew about those customers” where 
information had not been provided to the customers in a “clear and fair” way.214  
The important distinction between the SFO and the regulatory agencies is one that the SFO 
has been at pains to emphasize in recent months. Speaking at the TRACE Global Anti-
Bribery In-House Network (GAIN) Conference in October 2016, the Joint Head of Fraud, 
Hannah von Dadelszen announced, “We are a law enforcement agency and not a regulator 
...we are not in the business of telling people how not to rob a bank ... [and] to take on an 
advisory role would be to assume functions which simply aren’t in our enabling legislation. 
We are investigators and prosecutors”.215 
Other weaknesses in the regulatory approach 
The general efficacy of the regulatory approach to deal with “real crime” has been a matter of 
considerable doubt for some considerable time.
216
 Experience of financial services regulation 
suggests that its role is questionable. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 
reported in 2013-14 that, “misconceived and poorly-targeted regulation has been a major 
contributory factor across the full range of banking standards failings ... (r)egulators were 
complicit in banks outsourcing responsibility for compliance to them by accepting narrow 
conformity to rules as evidence of prudent conduct”.217 Although the level of FCA fines had 
begun to exceed those previously issued by the FSA, they decreased dramatically from the 
start of 2016,
218
 after George Osborne’s Mansion House speech in 2015, expressing the 
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concern that ratcheting up ever-larger fines simply penalises shareholders, erodes capital 
reserves and diminishes the lending potential of the economy.
219
 In their October 2016 
Report, the financial services think-tank, New City Agenda, and Cass Business School 
identified the limitations of ever more detailed regulation and that policy-makers need to 
acknowledge and work to remove the culture of secrecy that has developed within regulatory 
agencies.
220
 It noted particularly that the FCA still lacks independence, continuing to be 
susceptible to pressure from both politicians and industry.
221
 In economic terms, this poses 
the risk that it might be subject to regulatory capture.
222
 Furthermore, the compliance costs 
now amount to a significant barrier to entry, the FCA and PRA rulebooks, guidance and 
supervisory statements, together comprising a staggering quantity of information exceeding 
13,000 pages.
223
 Similarly, the cost of compliance must be added to the operating costs of the 
regulators themselves, the total administrative costs of the FCA, PRA, Financial Ombudsman 
Service, Financial Services Compensation Scheme and Money Advice Service alone now 
reaching almost £1.2 billion a year, a six fold increase since 2000.
224
  
 
Deference to the regulatory regime where fraud is concerned 
 
The regulatory regime is considered quasi-criminal in nature in that it typically employs a 
mixture of civil sanctions to encourage compliance, backed up by criminal provisions for 
breach. Regulations tend to be drafted as “strict liability” which means that no blameworthy 
mental state is required to accompany one or more of the physical elements amounting to the 
breach. This approach neatly side-steps the criminal law’s problem of attribution and proving 
of corporate mens rea. Further, the quasi-moral view of crime, requiring blameworthiness on 
the part of the defendant, is typically met with the availability of a due diligence defence.
225
 
This reverse onus defence allows the offence to be treated as if it were a mens rea offence in 
that the defendant is permitted to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that all reasonable 
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precautions had been taken to avoid the harm in question.
226
 Although largely unsuccessful, 
the preference for regulatory enforcement over criminal prosecution has precluded the use of 
the stronger tool in cases of serious corporate fraud. Consequently perhaps, scant attention 
has been given to the problem of attribution in the criminal law and there has been little 
motivation to develop a principle of corporate liability for fraud. There is some economic 
justification for the regulatory approach by analogy with the debate over the use of ex ante or 
ex post legal responses to safety regulation.
227
 In the context of fraud there is much to be said 
for seeking to address issues ex ante where there are issues of judgement problems that may 
affect access to a remedy and the magnitude of potential claims could put in jeopardy the 
ability of the perpetrator to pay. However, where serious criminal offences are combined with 
a due diligence regime with recognised standards it might be possible to realise the benefit of 
both the ex ante and ex post approaches. 
 
The architects of the Fraud Act 2006 clearly envisaged corporate prosecutions for fraud;
228
 
however, the reality has not met expectations. Following an earlier consultation between the 
regulator and the regulated in the context of misleading market practices, the Law 
Commission had already dismissed prosecutions of this nature in the corporate context, 
deferring instead to the regulatory regime. Specifically, it stated that, “many other offences 
which can be described as frauds”229 are “usually seen as specialist branches of fraud, which 
require separate consideration”.230 This response accorded with the recommendation made 2 
decades earlier by the Royal Commission which had confined the activity of the CPS to 
prosecutions for what was considered mainstream crime.
231
 Initial optimism that the Fraud 
Act would provide an important new weapon in the fight against major financial crime was 
therefore misplaced; although the Act has been in force for 10 years, prosecutions for 
corporate frauds are rarely brought before the criminal courts and the response continues to 
hover somewhere between civil sanction for regulatory breach and civil private action. 
Excluded from mainstream prosecution, systemic fraud committed in the corporate context 
has therefore continued to attract a different moral compass.
232
   
                                                             
226 Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts (2002), para.6.25 and see too C. Wells, 
“Corporations and Criminal Responsibility” (Oxford University Press, 2001) pp.101 - 102. 
227 See generally C. Veljanovski, “The Economics of Law” (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2006, p. 157. 
228 Fraud Act 2006, s.12 implicitly provides that company officers may liable for fraud as individuals where they 
have consented or connived with the fraud of the body corporate. 
229
 Law Commission, Report on Fraud (2002), para.2.26, p.11. 
230 Law Commission, Report on Fraud (2002), para.2.27, p.12. The explanation given was that the decision to 
keep “specialist branches of fraud” separate followed consultation between regulator and regulated in the 
context of misleading market practices to help draw the line between sharp practice and criminal practice. 
231 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (The Phillips Commission) 1977, reported in 1981, “The 
Investigation and Prosecution of Criminal Offences in England and Wales: the law and procedure” (1980/81 
Cmnd. 8092-I and II). 
232 Of note, when the Royal Commission provided the recommendations that formed the basis of the new 
Crown Prosecution Service in 1981, the ambit of the report was confined to mainstream crime,, Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure (The Phillips Commission) 1977, reported in 1981, The Investigation and 
Prosecution of Criminal Offences in England and Wales: the law and procedure (Cmnd. 8092-I and II, 1980/81).  
The Commission gave little attention to the non-police agencies, commenting that “prosecution is the weapon 
of final resort because they prefer to obtain their objectives by education and persuasion”. 
31 
 
Need for greater stigmatization  
 
The extent of financial misconduct witnessed in the last few decades, whether money-
laundering, fraud or bribery, demonstrates a strong case for the intervention of the criminal 
law. Inadequate consumer protection in the financial services sector, consequent upon the 
inadequacy of regulatory regimes, has been specifically identified as a major contributor to 
the global financial crisis of 2007/2008.
233
 At EU level, the mis-selling of financial products 
has resulted in significant consumer harm to the general detriment of market efficiency.
234
 
This is reflected in the UK’s Fair and Effective Markets Review of 2015 containing 
recommendations to deliver “fair” markets, these being defined as “markets in which 
participants behave with integrity ... [and] that means participants should be confident that 
they will not be subject to fraud, deception, disinformation, misrepresentation, manipulation 
or coercion.
235
 Without doubt, public trust has been damaged by numerous and extensive the 
mis-selling scandals that have been reported in recent years.
236
 The much criticized so-called 
“light touch” approach that became synonymous with regulation in the financial sector has 
given way to widely articulated calls for a more robust regime.
237
 Accordingly, measures are 
now underway to implement the Fair and Effective Markets initiatives
238
 within the 
industry
239
 as a means to ensure both individual and collective accountability for corporate 
misconduct, accompanied by financial disincentives and the call for tougher regulatory and 
criminal punishments.
240
  
 
The inherent nature of the corporate misconduct involved in fraudulent types of behaviours 
also demands its stigmatization as criminal activity, aside from the extent of the harm caused 
to individuals and to markets. This point was specifically argued in the context of the bribery 
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reform and, in its review of criminal liability in regulatory contexts, the Law Commission 
also proposed that criminal law should be employed where the stigma of conviction is 
deserved. This is identified in instances where the wrongdoer has engaged in seriously 
reprehensible conduct
241
 and the harm done or risked should be regarded as serious enough to 
warrant criminalization if, in some circumstances, an individual could justifiably be sent to 
prison for a first offence, or an unlimited fine is necessary to address the seriousness of the 
wrongdoing.
242
 Furthermore, serious offences are those involving dishonesty, intention, 
knowledge or recklessness
243
 and the Law Commission specifically contemplated the fraud 
based offences
244
 where the harm relates a moral failing and not just to a breach of a rule or a 
departure from a standard.
245
   
 
Need for a corporate sanction 
 
There is a risk that the punitive aim has simply shifted the focus onto the particular 
individuals behind fraudulent market manipulation and financial crime, through measures for 
improved accountability at senior management level.
246
 However, although individual 
accountability is certainly to the fore,
247
 it is of note that the Bribery Act 2010 has taken a 
robust approach to corporate prosecution, doing so on the basis of the harm inflicted on 
economic markets
248
 and that these measures form part of a larger picture which includes a 
renewed commitment to extend corporate responsibility and, in particular, the “failure to 
prevent” construction of liability to other economic crimes249 such as fraud. In cases which 
merit the attachment of a serious stigma, such as potentially wide-spread mis-selling cases, it 
is appropriate that the stigma attaches to the corporate actor responsible to as to secure 
maximum deterrence. 
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THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE “FAILURE TO PREVENT” MODEL TO 
“ECONOMIC CRIME”, SPECIFICALLY FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL SERVICES 
CONTEXT 
 
While the need to bring corporate economic crime within the mainstream criminal law is 
becoming increasingly evident, the suggestion of a new corporate economic offence premised 
on the “failure to prevent” model of liability would provide only limited redress, based on an 
overly narrow and myopic conceptualisation of the problem. Although the “failure to 
prevent” construction has achieved much needed theoretical advancements to the criminal 
law’s response to corporate wrongdoing, a generic “one size fits all” model of corporate 
criminality simply cannot accommodate the very different underlying bases of very different 
substantive offences. Supplementing the common law’s identification doctrine, which 
facilitates a corporate conviction for bribery based on the culpability of its “directing mind 
and will”, the corporate “failure to prevent” offence provides the means by which a company 
can now be made liable in relation to this activity at the lower, “rogue” employee, level. The 
“failure to prevent” model implicitly recognizes and treats the corporate body as a 
responsibility-bearing actor, distinct from its individual members. This aspect accords with 
the now widely recognised holist view of the organisation, such that it can become an 
autonomous actor whose behaviour “transcends specific individual contributions”250 and 
whose personality is unique.
251
 However, in that the corporate liability can only be imposed 
where a rogue employee or associated person has committed an underlying offence, the 
Bribery Act 2010 conforms to the traditional individualist paradigm that continues to pervade 
the criminal law. Accordingly, the corporate conviction for the “failure to prevent” an 
underlying offence is, like the identification doctrine, parasitic in nature. 
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“Failure to prevent” inappropriate where corporate rather than individual dishonesty 
 
The parasitic approach to organisational fault may be well suited to dealing with conduct 
such as bribery and tax evasion but it is of limited application to criminal fraud which, by its 
nature, poses unique challenges.
252
 Unlike bribery, fraud is not an activity in itself but the 
way in which an otherwise lawful activity is performed.
253
 Whereas the inducement of the 
improper performance of a function or activity, subject to a test of what a reasonable person 
would expect, underpins bribery,
254
 dishonesty is the determinative characteristic of fraud and 
it is this hallmark that distinguishes lawful from criminal behaviour.
255
 Thus, while corporate 
liability for bribery or tax evasion can flow from the substantive crime having been 
committed by the individual employee or associate,
256
 corporate fraud will not always attach 
to an underlying offence committed by an individual. Although there will be instances in 
which it will be established that the guilt of a directing mind can be attributed to the company 
through the common law principle and also instances where a “rogue” employee has acted 
fraudulently, with the requisite dishonesty, there will be others in which individual culpability 
may not arise. For example, the recent mis-selling scandals point more readily to the 
existence of a criminogenic corporate culture in which dishonesty cannot necessarily be 
located either in individual directors or in the potentially numerous individual employees 
involved in the sales practice. If the particular activity, here the “mis-selling”, is deemed 
dishonest, the dishonest culture may well have emerged as a result of various divergent 
factors such as corporate and individual sales targets, sales policies and risk aversion 
strategies, all or some of which at some point overlapping and ultimately culminating in the 
reprehensible conduct itself. In such circumstances it is entirely conceivable that the honesty 
of individual employees who have been engaged in the practice will not be in doubt, for 
example where the product sold was one of a range offered by the organisation and the 
selling of it was an encouraged or essential part of the individual’s contract of employment, 
consistent with company policy and part of a company-wide, and perhaps industry-wide, 
practice.
257
 Accordingly, the attribution of corporate liability for an economic crime which is 
parasitic in nature, such as fraud, cannot work where the individuals involved in the conduct 
cannot be said to be dishonest and have therefore not committed any underlying offence.  
 
Thus, in the context of corporate fraud, the “identification principle” and the “failure to 
prevent” approaches can deal with some forms of offending, but not all. Similarly, where the 
physical elements of the conduct in question are performed by subordinate employees who 
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are probably not dishonest, it is unlikely that they will be viewed as accessories to the offence 
since this would require an intention to assist or belief that their actions are capable of doing 
so. In such circumstances, the criminal law may invoke the doctrine of innocent agent,
258
 
whereby the individuals performing the actus reus of the crime possess no blameworthy state 
of mind with the result that criminal liability rests entirely with the person who instigates the 
conduct, assuming that this person has the necessary mens rea to make out the offence. 
However, this analysis is equally problematic in that it inevitably leads to the perennial 
challenge posed by the requirement of mens rea and, bearing in mind the deficiencies in the 
identification doctrine, how the necessary dishonesty and intention might be attributed to the 
corporate actor. 
 
“Failure to prevent” inappropriate where the parties to criminal activity may include 
the company itself 
 
There are further serious differences in the inherent nature of money-laundering, fraud, tax 
evasion and bribery which mean that the “failure to prevent” model of fault attribution may 
be much less effective. For example, the parties involved in bribery and tax evasion are fairly 
clear, whereas with fraud the victim may not only be third parties, such as the public, but the 
company itself. Such a consequence would render the imposition of corporate liability for 
“failure to prevent” uncomfortable at an intuitive level and controversial, as was the case in 
Moore v Bresler Ltd [1944],
259
 the Divisional court finding that the corporate defendant was 
both the victim and the perpetrator of the fraud.     
 
CRIMINALISING THE CORPORATION: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM  
The primary mechanism for attributing corporate criminal liability continues to be the 
common law identification doctrine which operates for both common law and statutory 
offences but is, of course, strictly limited by the need to find that the substantive offence has 
been committed by an individual who represents the controlling or directing mind of the 
organisation. This works well in instances where, for example, the owner/director of a small 
company commits an offence using the corporate form as the vehicle to do so. In cases 
involving a “rogue” employee who is not correlated with a “directing mind and will” the 
corporate “failure to prevent” is a suitable means to attribute organisational liability and the 
offence is well-framed to express the nature of the corporate wrongdoing. However, an 
altogether different basis of liability is needed to establish corporate fault of a quality that is 
not reducible to the criminality of particular individuals. This section evaluates potential 
alternative approaches to reform. 
 
A “failure to comply with prescribed standards” model? 
The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 constructed a bespoke model 
of liability, confined to manslaughter, which essentially turns on gross negligence but, unlike 
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the common law doctrine, serves to aggregate the fault of senior managers.
260
 Otherwise, 
alternative proposals for a generic basis of corporate criminal liability tend to focus on the 
attribution of fault by reference to the corporate conduct falling below some objective 
standard or by some failure to comply with a particular duty.
261
 The “failure to comply with 
prescribed standards” model avoids the tricky issue of mens rea altogether by constructing 
liability on a negligence-type basis. Negligence is not a mental state but necessitates an 
objective assessment of behaviour measured by reference to standards of reasonableness. 
Arguably, this model constitutes the essence of the regulatory approaches which have been 
discussed above and, as an approach to corporate misbehaviour, negligence attracts little 
criticism. However, as a mark of criminality, negligence arguably fails in its expressive 
function, conveying far less opprobrium than the notions traditionally invoked with 
requirements of intentionality, subjective recklessness and dishonesty.
262
 In this respect, the 
conduct is typically considered more akin to regulatory non-compliance than true criminality 
and, constructed in this way, lacks the deterrent bite of the threat of conviction for “real” 
crime. It is of note that individuals are not generally subject to criminal sanction on the basis 
of negligence
263
 and a more blameworthy state of mind is required before the criminal law is 
invoked. As a matter of principle, offence definitions should capture the true nature of the 
organisational criminality and do so by reference to a culpable standard comparable to 
individual liability.
264
 Furthermore, in contrast to the more defining requirements of criminal 
intent and the traditional “act doctrine”, negligence is controversial as a basis of criminal 
liability in that it is more readily associated with a failure to act or to take sufficient care 
when doing so.  
 
In the context of corporate fraud, neither the “failure to comply” with prescribed standards 
nor the negligence-type models are satisfactory. The suggestion that a company can commit 
fraud through negligence or omission fails to express the true nature of fraud which typically 
involves dishonesty and the making of some false or misleading statement with intent. As 
both models avoid corporate prosecution for the substantive offence, the organisation would 
not have a conviction for fraud but for wrongdoing of an altogether different nature; neither 
approach truly acknowledging that companies themselves can behave fraudulently through 
the emergence of a criminogenic culture. Furthermore, the fact that a statement may be both 
true and at the same time misleading undermines any approach which does not encompass the 
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notion of dishonesty.
265
 It is this essential element that leads back to the seemingly intractable 
conundrum, how to attribute mens rea to modern, structurally diverse corporations.   
 
An evidential presumption as to corporate liability? 
 
Intractable as this challenge may be, insurmountable it is not. Indeed, the obstacles posed by 
the need to attribute corporate mens rea, namely dishonesty and fraudulent intention, can be 
overcome with a simple Criminal Practice Direction in relation to the trial process for 
offending of this nature. This would amount to no more than a clear restatement of orthodox 
and well-established evidential presumptions within the criminal law. Indeed, the 
presumption of intention was placed on a statutory footing by Criminal Justice Act 1967, s. 8 
acknowledging that a person may be presumed to have intended or foreseen the natural and 
probable consequence of his act, and that the presumption may be refuted by other evidence 
raising contrary inferences.
266
 This provision clarified the position after the misinterpretation 
in DPP v. Smith [1961],
267
 the evidential presumption being generally applicable in criminal 
law despite the language of “natural and probable consequences” being the subject of a 
judicial onslaught in the narrow context of the murder offence.
268
 Accordingly, the requisite 
intention in relation to fraud, i.e. the intention to make a gain for oneself or another or to 
cause loss or expose another to a risk of loss, can be established in this way. As a matter of 
statutory interpretation, this clearly applies in a corporate context because Sch. 1, 
Interpretation Act 1978 states that where an act refers to a “person” this includes a body of 
persons incorporate or unincorporated. The orthodox presumptive approach has the 
advantage of enabling a finding of corporate intention in the absence of a metaphysical 
“mind” while leaving the traditional actus reus / mens rea construct of criminality 
undisturbed. A corporate intent for fraud would be readily ascertained by the inference that 
the organisation intended to make a gain as a result of, for example, its sales activity, since 
this is the natural and probable result of such activity. 
 
The presumptive approach to dishonesty is also well-established, the use of false statements 
being prima facie evidence of an intention to defraud which is, itself, synonymous with 
dishonesty.
269
 It is suggested that the notion of dishonesty operates at 2 levels and, taking 
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fraud by false representation by way of illustration,
270
 proof of a false representation is itself 
proof of a dishonest means while evidence of an intention to gain or cause a loss equates to 
proof of a dishonest end. In effect, the issue of dishonesty is presumed from the conduct such 
that the evidential burden is effectively shifted to the defendant where honesty is claimed, for 
example through a “claim of right” defence.271 On this construction of liability, a corporate 
defendant would be afforded the opportunity, as are individual defendants, to assert that the 
activity in which it was involved was an honest one. Indeed, this approach conforms to the 
common law test of dishonesty as expressed in R v Ghosh [1982] which contains both an 
objective and subjective limb.
272
 The presumptive mechanisms of fault attribution have been 
supported elsewhere with the recognition that the orthodox evidential presumptions are 
entirely consistent with the subjective individualist account of criminal doctrine as supported 
by recent neuro-scientific findings.
273
 Accordingly, culpability for financial crime can be 
attributed directly to a corporation without disturbing existing doctrine, where this more 
readily reflects the nature of the wrongdoing and wrongdoer. In this respect, the Canadian 
courts have gone further still in that the subjective prong of the Ghosh
274
 test of dishonesty is 
not applied
275
 and it is considered objectively as a part of the actus reus, playing only a 
minimum part in mens rea as “fraudulently”.276 The implication of the explicit 
acknowledgement of the presumptive approach is that a mainstream prosecution for fraud 
could be brought
277
 against a corporation where the conduct appears fraudulent, i.e. where 
there is a false or misleading statement made with a view to making a gain or cause a loss to 
another and the ordinary decent person would consider it dishonest. Again, a Criminal 
Practice Direction, or guidance, could be used to clarify the application of the evidential 
presumptions and how a defence might be raised by the defendant, corporate or otherwise, in 
rebuttal. Where the charge is one of corporate fraud, premised on dishonesty as the 
determinative characteristic, the corporation can, like any individual, defend the allegation on 
the basis that what it did was not dishonest.    
 
The authors have concluded that the evidential presumption is the most effective way to 
address corporate liability. Supplementing the legal and procedural developments necessary 
to address the problem of criminogenic organisations and corporate fraud, the consequential 
resource implications could be met with a fundamental, and likely cost-effective, shift in 
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funding from regulation and regulatory compliance to bodies concerned with the 
investigation and prosecution of serious crime. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The international and national scale of the problems of money-laundering, fraud, bribery and 
tax evasion pose serious challenges to legal systems. There is some evidence to suggest that 
the enforcement of the Bribery Act 2010 “failure to prevent” model of corporate criminality 
has been more effective than the traditional model of liability based around the individualist 
approach that requires proof of mens rea and its application to the corporation via the 
identification principle. It is unsurprising, therefore, that policymakers are turning to this new 
model as a potential panacea, despite the appearance of uncertainty resulting from policy 
changes. Nonetheless, the evidence as to corporate awareness of the new legislation is mixed 
and to date there has been just one conviction, and three DPA’s, for this offence. History, 
however, demonstrates the need for caution. The bribery legislation was enacted because the 
UK was in danger of being seen as soft internationally in its response compared with other 
jurisdictions such as the US. Insofar as there are historical precedents for the use of a “failure 
to prevent” approach, they were generally unsuccessful and eventually repealed. Perhaps the 
closest example can be found in the Money-Laundering Regulations 2007 but on closer 
examination it is little more than a regulatory offence to ensure detailed administrative 
compliance. The true novelty of the Bribery Act 2010 “failure to prevent” offence was the 
creation of a serious criminal offence that blurs the line with regulatory offences by allowing 
a defence based on regulatory-type compliance. In addition, the Bribery Act is enforced by 
the SFO and CPS rather than the FCA and PRA which suggests a much tougher enforcement 
stance, even though the fines issued by the FCA are growing in size and consequent ability to 
deter. In contrast, many issues relating to potentially fraudulent conduct are treated in the 
regulatory system as little more than matters of consumer protection, an insufficiently robust 
response. This, it is submitted is wrong, fraud and bribery should both be stigmatized and 
subjected to the full weight of the law alike. Whilst there are benefits to both the common law 
“identification” principle and an “economic crime” of “failure to prevent” fraud, combined 
with due diligence defence, these will not work in all cases, namely where the fraud involves 
corporate rather than individual dishonesty. In such situations, a new model of criminalising 
the corporation is needed. 
The board of directors of a company subject to the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016 is 
expected to set a company’s strategic aims, its values and standards; they are further expected 
to provide entrepreneurial leadership within a framework of prudent and effective controls 
which enable risk to be assessed and managed (Section A.1 Supporting Principles). No board 
of directors should, in effect, be able to deny knowledge of a widespread dishonest culture in 
their company, especially where the directors may benefit from such a culture by way of their 
remuneration packages. Where there is such a culture the company itself, in addition to 
individuals, must be stigmatized. The authors submit that the most straightforward way of 
achieving such stigmatization is by a simple Criminal Practice Direction in relation to 
offending of this nature restating orthodox and well-established evidential presumptions in 
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the criminal law. Such stigmatization will send a powerful signal to markets who can respond 
appropriately in how they value the company and, through the takeover mechanism, lead to 
changes in the board of directors beyond the reach of the criminal law. In this way, it is hoped 
that through the complementary roles of a strong criminal law which is necessary to protect 
investors’ property rights and the operation of efficient market forces, criminogenic corporate 
leadership will be driven out of the market and criminal corporate culture replaced by socially 
desirable behaviour. 
